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ABSTRACT 
Lone-wolf terrorist attacks have occurred in the United States throughout the country’s 
history. Attempted attacks from individual terrorists unaffiliated with terrorist groups 
may be becoming more prevalent. Both the general public and government officials 
acknowledge the presence and importance of these attacks; however, relatively little 
literature exists on the subject compared to group terrorism. Much of the information on 
lone wolves has been established by case study, inference, and known characteristics of 
group terrorism. The purpose of this study is to analyze the characteristics of lone-wolf 
terrorism through formal statistical models. The study then synthesizes data with case 
study and existing literature to formulate a base of knowledge for lone-wolf terrorism. 
This study demonstrates that no single dispositional profile of a lone-wolf terrorist 
exists. The individuals who engage in the tactic of lone-wolf terrorism form a unique 
ideology that combines personal grievances with common terrorist goals. Still, many 
lone-wolf cases exhibit certain characteristics. This thesis analyzes these characteristics 
and their relationship with successful attacks. These data on characteristics, goals, and 
motivations of lone wolves purport policies to increase engagement between the 
community and curb lone-wolf terrorism and its effects. 
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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHENOMENON OF LONE-
WOLF TERRORISM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Who’s afraid of the big, bad [lone] wolf? 
- Adapted from The Three Little Pigs (1933) 
Beginning this thesis with a nursery rhyme belies the magnitude of the effect that 
lone-wolf style terrorism has had on the United States (U.S.). Many American citizens 
are able to visualize the unkempt, bearded face of “Unabomber” Ted Kaczynski, the 
army fatigue-clad Timothy McVeigh, and the haunting smile of Major Nidal Malik 
Hasan. These terrorists, like their brethren who constitute terrorist groups, such as al 
Qaeda, hold a permanent place in American history. Americans are afraid of the lone 
wolf. 
Lone-wolf terrorism has occurred for a long time. Numerous cases of Russian 
anarchists assassinating political and popular figures in the nineteenth century abound 
(Kushner, 2003). Individuals planned and executed many of these attacks. The United 
States also experienced this form of terror throughout the twentieth century. Individuals 
who ideologically believe in white supremacy, far-right Christianity, or anti-abortion 
have conducted the majority of these cases. The term “lone wolf” has been credited to 
white supremacists who advocated using the tactic to bring about political change 
(Spaaij, 2010). These lone wolves may even believe they are acting as God’s “Phineas 
Priests.” Danny Davis (2010) writes that these terrorists deem that when “civil authority 
fails to execute righteous judgment, God has given [them] authority to execute judgment” 
(p. 5). Ironically, solo Islamist extremists may use a similar justification for their attacks. 
Right-wing terrorism and extreme Islam are ideologically opposed; however, both 
ideologies use religion to justify their actions.  
Although the far right continues to be a concern in the United States, Islamist 
lone-wolf attacks in the United States have dominated national attention. In fact, these 
attacks may be becoming more prevalent. Since 2001, Muslim extremists have conducted 
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at least eighteen lone-wolf style attacks, which leads one to believe that Islamist 
extremists are encouraging lone-wolf terrorism in a “grassroots” effort to promote this 
view (Integrated Threat Assessment Center, 2007, p. 3). Inspire magazine, a glossy and 
digitally available publication geared towards inciting jihad in extremists, overtly 
promotes lone-wolf terrorism as an effective method against the western world (al-Suri, 
2010). 
U.S. officials have acknowledged the increased threat and frequency of domestic 
lone-wolf terrorism. In February 2011, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Secretary Janet Napolitano announced to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee 
on Homeland Security that a primary threat was domestically radicalized individuals 
(Understanding the Homeland Threat Landscape—Considerations for the 112th 
Congress, 2011). She reiterated that these individuals would be ready, willing, and able to 
conduct terrorist attacks with little or no warning (Understanding the Homeland Threat 
Landscape—Considerations for the 112th Congress, 2011). The Heritage Foundation has 
shown that at least forty Islamist-inspired terrorist plots have been foiled since September 
11, 2001 (9/11) in the United States (Carafano & Zuckerman, 2011). Lone wolves and 
small autonomous cells acting under their own instigation have conducted many of these 
attacks. 
The diverse ideologies and types of lone-wolf cases experienced in the United 
States lead to an essential point—lone-wolf terrorism is a tactic, not a cause or ideology 
of its own. This thesis explores how the phenomenon of lone-wolf terrorism has changed 
in the United States since 9/11. Additionally, it attempts to decipher why the tactic is 
used and the incentives for using it. Lone-wolf attacks, attack attempts, and foiled plots 
are analyzed to identify salient traits and characteristics. 
Terrorism is defined using Bruce Hoffman’s definition, which states that 
terrorism is “violence…or the threat of violence used and directed in pursuit of, or in 
service of, a political aim” (Hoffman, 2006, pp. 2–3). The lone-wolf tactic is a subset of 
terrorism. For the purpose of this thesis, a lone wolf is a person who attempts or succeeds 
in a terrorist act and who does the following. 
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 Plans and executes operations individually 
 Does not receive instruction from an organized terrorist group or network 
 Initially radicalizes without direct influence and recruitment from a 
terrorist group 
It is clear that these terrorists exist and are a threat to the United States; however, 
an inadequate amount of information is available on lone wolves, which has led to a 
deficiency in the collective knowledge on this apropos subject. 
B.  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Terrorist groups have been analyzed at great lengths since 9/11, which has not 
been the case with lone-wolf terrorism. It is possible that terrorism scholars have focused 
on group dynamics because terrorism is a phenomenon largely considered a collective 
activity (Instituut voor Veiligheids-en Crisismanagement, 2007). This belief is in direct 
contrast to the amount of media and political attention that has been directed towards 
lone-wolf terrorism. Quantitative studies have been conducted on group terrorism. These 
studies have found characteristics of group terrorism and conclusions regarding 
mitigation tactics (e.g., Jones & Libicki, 2008). A comprehensive statistical analysis has 
not been conducted on lone-wolf terrorism in the United States. 
Domestic lone-wolf terrorists are typically unknown to law enforcement prior to 
conducting attacks and the nature of lone terrorist offenders makes it challenging to 
assign a singular theology to this classification of attacker. This lack of familiarity is 
troubling because domestic lone-wolf-type attacks may be becoming more prevalent in 
the United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Robert Mueller has 
stated that domestic lone-wolf style terrorism will increase. In 2003, Mueller said, “the 
threat from single individuals sympathetic or affiliated with al-Qaeda, acting without 
external support or surrounding conspiracies, is increasing” (War on Terrorism, 2003). In 
2007, he added that he was particularly concerned about “lone wolf actor(s)…not tied in 
with any particular group overseas” (Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland: 
Six Years after 9/11, 2007). It is particularly difficult to prevent lone-wolf terrorist 
attacks because these actors plan and operate in isolation. It is difficult for law 
enforcement to detect them because they often radicalize without the direct influence of a 
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charismatic terrorist leader. Lone wolves rarely have any direct contact with terrorist 
group leaders and may radicalize using the anonymity of the Internet (United States 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2008). 
Despite the number of attempts, little is known about lone-wolf terrorists because 
a large cadre of literature on this subject does not exist. Analysts have conducted case 
studies and reports on individual lone wolves; however, a quantitative statistical analysis 
of characteristics of lone-wolf attackers and their attempts at terrorism does not exist. 
This void results in an absence of factually based policy and strategy to curtail lone-wolf 
terrorism.  
Effective policy can only be created after definitive characteristics of lone-wolf 
attacks are formed, which has not been accomplished at this time. Also, a need exists for 
analyzing which characteristics of previous attacks have been indicators of successful 
attacks. This analysis could include personal characteristics, such as age or level of 
education, planning processes, or tactics, such as weapon or target. A characterization of 
the motivations of lone wolves has not been conducted. Many of these attackers profess 
they are fighting for a cause, but, it is unknown why and who chooses the lone-wolf 
method instead of joining a terrorist group.  
The scientific study of lone-wolf terrorism, like the discipline of homeland 
security, is in its infancy. A need does exist to synthesize current scholarly literature with 
statistical analysis to increase the collective knowledge on the phenomenon of lone-wolf 
terrorism. 
C. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to analyze characteristics of lone-wolf terrorists using 





Since 9/11, there have been numerous lone-wolf style attacks and attempted 
attacks in the United States. Some policies and legislation have been developed to curb 
the tactic, but, these may have been developed as short-term solutions due to specific past 
cases of lone-wolf terrorism. Ineffective policy will continue to be developed if it is 
based on inferential conclusions found in a few cases of lone-wolf terrorism. 
Quantitative, qualitative, and descriptive statistical analysis were used to examine 
data on lone-wolf terrorism in this thesis. The researcher compiled a list of lone-wolf 
attacks and attempts using existing, vetted databases. Information and characteristics 
were collected for each attack and attempt. These data were analyzed to identify 
characteristics found in a significant number of cases. Additionally, tests were conducted 
to find relationships between certain characteristics. 
The synthesis of quantitative and qualitative analysis supports the discovery 
process in finding the best description of lone-wolf terrorism. This research may make 
apparent fundamental differences in the characteristics of lone and group terrorists. 
Additionally, gleaned information can be used to decipher the goals, motivations, and 
incentives of lone-wolf terrorists. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What patterns are present in the data on lone-wolf terrorists and their attacks? 
 What are the characteristics of lone-wolf terrorists? 
 What factors and characteristics are related to successful lone-wolf 
attacks? 
 What are the incentives, goals, and motivations for an extremist to choose 
the lone-wolf tactic? 
 Are lone-wolf attacks random, isolated events? 
 What policies and recommendations can be instituted to reduce the 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A recent surge in high profile lone-wolf attacks has occurred in the United States. 
The prevalence of these attacks and attempts has placed additional scrutiny on policies 
regarding these specific terrorists. Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 
Janet Napolitano (2011) has stated that individual terrorism is an increasing problem. 
Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies have pursued and disrupted lone-wolf 
attacks on multiple occasions in the past few years. Still, a discrepancy exists between the 
amount of attention these attacks have received in the media and law enforcement when 
compared to the sum of scholarly literature and scientific data (Spaaij, 2010). 
Literature and data are the foundation of strong policy. It will be necessary to 
bolster research on lone-wolf terrorism prior to enacting effective policy to reduce the 
occurrence of attack and mitigate the consequences. The synthesis of existing literature 
combined with novel analysis will increase the collective knowledge of lone-wolf 
terrorism. 
The following literature review focuses on the scholarly literature and scientific 
data in three areas integral in understanding what is known about lone-wolf terrorism. 
The first section reviews qualitative characteristics of the tactic of lone-wolf attacks to 
include information that shows a shift towards the incidence of this tactic and the 
rationalization behind these attacks, as well as the increased occurrence. The goal of this 
section is to isolate characteristics of lone wolves and show that the tactic is prevalent. 
The second section examines the psychological and motivational forces behind lone 
wolves, which includes the goals and strategies used by extreme groups to promote lone-
wolf terrorism, the motivational strategies and motivations of these terrorists, and the 
psychology of lone wolves. The goal of this section is to review the motivations and 
incentives for lone wolves and the factors that influence them. The third section reviews 
past and current trends and policies in lone-wolf terrorism to include signs and models 
that might predict or precede lone, domestic violent activity. Additionally, the role of the 
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Internet in promoting lone-wolf terrorism is examined. The goal of this section is to 
explore the effectiveness of existing policies and predictive models and to deduce if lone-
wolf attacks are random, isolated events.  
B. THE TACTIC OF DOMESTIC LONE-WOLF TERRORISM 
Louis Beam (1992) wrote that leaderless resistance is a fundamental departure 
from common themes of political and social organization. Beam, a white nationalist and 
proud Klansman, is not a lone wolf; however, he clearly understands the tactic. He 
argued that the departure from pyramidal organization was essential to subvert a 
tyrannical U.S. Government that operated solely in a hierarchal fashion. Hierarchal 
organization with numerous members could be easily penetrated while a single actor 
could not. Extreme right-wing lone wolves have used this concept in the United States 
throughout the 1990s (Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, 2007). Some terrorist groups 
also organize into intimate, self-sustaining cells to avoid detection.  
Extreme Islamist leaders have likewise endorsed the tactic of lone-wolf terrorism. 
Lone, domestic actors eliminate the need for the terrorist group to provide travel and 
overseas training. The total amount of risk for capture is reduced. The tactic may also be 
popular now due to the success of heightened U.S. homeland security efforts (Integrated 
Threat Assessment Centre, 2007). U.S. international travel policy, legislation, such as 
expanded federal powers in the USA PATRIOT Act, and law enforcement training, 
among other efforts, have made it more difficult for terrorist groups to penetrate the 
United States easily after 9/11 in a cost-effective manner. 
The country’s diversity and its residents’ freedoms do not provide a firewall 
against radicalization and domestic terrorism (Bergen & Hoffman, 2010). In fact, lone-
wolf terrorists are a diverse population with many freedoms in the society. They share 
many of the same opportunities that all U.S. residents are offered. Some lone wolves 
have university and graduate degrees and others are employed in well-paying jobs. 
Terrorism expert Walter Laqueur (2003) notes that the modern terrorist must be educated 
and competent to thrive in the globalized and technological world. A sect of the best-
connected resident extremists, such as Anwar al-Awlaki and David Headley, has joined 
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international terrorist groups (Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, 2007). Connected, 
culturally competent terrorists pose a specific threat because of their intimate knowledge 
of American culture. Their immersion in the culture facilitates recruitment methods that 
can be marketed towards U.S. residents who harbor an extreme ideology. Al-Awlaki’s 
Inspire magazine, a glossy piece of English-language literature aimed at inciting jihad in 
western followers, has stimulated American jihadists in the past year. An article in the 
fall 2010 issue of Inspire specifies that hierarchal campaigns against the west may not be 
feasible; rather, lone-wolf terrorism conducted by residents would be more effective (al-
Suri, 2010). Al-Suri (2010) does not give details about his intended audience, but 
promotes the tactic to all “believers.” Lone-wolf cases examined in this thesis, such as 
Naser Abdo, were familiar with Inspire. Abdo was arrested after attempting to purchase 
firearms and build an explosive to be used at Fort Hood, Texas. Inspire magazine is 
widely available to the public on the Internet. 
The role of the Internet in radicalizing individuals not connected to extremist 
groups is both significant and increasing. Additionally, foreign and domestic terrorists 
have created Internet publications and websites that detail best practices on committing 
terrorist acts. Al Qaeda has been particularly adept at using the Internet to its advantage. 
A 2008 report by the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs emphasizes the role that the Internet plays in proliferating terrorism. The 
committee finds that al Qaeda has made a tactical decision to increase the production of 
online propaganda, which is important because it allows the group to bypass traditional 
media outlets that might alter and adulterate messaging (United States Senate Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2008.). Culturally capable terrorist 
operatives write or translate text into English so that western sympathizers and lone 
wolves can digest it (United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, 2008). These texts, which often glorify violence and jihad, appeal 
to younger audiences who may be most susceptible to radicalization, which is especially 
true for charismatic, relatable authors, such as recently killed cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. 
Lone wolves find the Internet particularly useful because of the ease of accessibility and 
anonymity (Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, 2007). The Internet also allows 
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organizations to release vetted information directly at a desired time to an open audience 
(United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
2008). Open information is valuable to lone wolves because they typically do not have 
advanced training in weapons or terrorist tactics. Many online articles are handbooks on 
individual terrorist tactics including how to make bombs and use advanced firearms. In 
July 2007, lone actor Naser Abdo was caught plotting a terrorist attack after purchasing 
the exact ingredients listed in the article, “How to Build a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your 
Mom” in the Inspire online magazine. Inspire magazine is an important terrorist device 
because it can be accessed in the United States over the Internet by a lone wolf. The 
potential terrorist does not need to travel abroad or leave his home to learn lone-wolf 
terrorist tactics. In fact, a National Institute of Justice study found that forty-four percent 
of terrorist attacks in the United States occur within thirty miles of a terrorist’s residence 
(United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
2008.). 
Lone-wolf terrorists conducted the majority of terrorist attacks in the United 
States from 1978–2001 (Hewitt, 2003). This form of terrorism is particularly germane to 
the United States due to the high occurrence in comparison to other western countries 
(Hewitt, 2003.). In the United States, lone-wolf and group terrorist planning and attacks 
tend to occur in proximity to their residences (Smith, 2008).  
The prevalence of lone-wolf style attacks in the United States is acknowledged 
and documented. Civil rights organizations, news outlets, and the media continue to 
cover lone-wolf attacks and cases foiled by law enforcement. In 1999, Mike Reynolds 
from the Southern Poverty Law Center predicted that lone-wolf attacks would become 
increasingly common in the future (as quoted in “New Face of Terror Crimes: ‘Lone 
Wolf’ Weaned on Hate,” 1999). No reason whatsoever exists to think that these attacks 
will discontinue soon. 
Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman list four main reasons why terrorist attacks will 
continue to occur. These reasons have clear links to lone-wolf style attacks. First, the 
cost-benefit analysis conducted by terrorists is in their favor (Bergen & Hoffman, 2010). 
Multiple, simplistic attacks conducted by novices may seem amateur; however, these 
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attackers radicalize quickly and receive no time-consuming training and eventually one 
or more will be successful (Bergen & Hoffman, 2010.). The attacks alone also raise 
awareness and fear amongst the U.S. population. Second, terrorism is inexpensive. Total 
costs of operations for small cell or lone-wolf attacks are in the low thousands of dollars 
(Bergen & Hoffman, 2010.). Third, part of terrorist strategy is to attack the west with 
many small plots over a long period of time in an ongoing campaign (Bergen & Hoffman, 
2010.). An exponential effect occurs as more and more lone-wolves attack. Fourth, small-
scale attacks will continue to be developed, as they are easier to plan and operationalize 
(Bergen & Hoffman, 2010.). This last point is the most telling—no attack group is 
smaller than a lone individual. 
Both group and individual terrorists deliberately choose extreme actions to 
publicize their views. Both choose actions that send a message of fear, raise awareness of 
their cause, influence local and international politics, destroy infrastructure, and correct 
the perceived injustice that they feel (Artiga, n.d.). Terrorism and terrorist attacks need 
input and output to be successful (Davis, 2010). The terrorist works in a specific society 
and culture—the attack is “shocking” because it is vastly different compared to cultural 
norms. In the end, the lone-wolf terrorist’s goal, regardless of ideology or rationale, is to 
affect the society that has marginalized his lifestyle and points of view.  
C. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS 
A combination of unique psychological and motivational factors may be present 
in extremists who choose to develop as lone wolves. Terrorist groups and their 
charismatic leaders are issuing propaganda specifically tailored to U.S. residents with 
likeminded views. Inspire magazine has included interesting articles targeted at a 
westernized, extreme Muslim. Many of the articles are explicitly violent and visually 
pleasing. Articles in Inspire magazine repeatedly claim that Islam is the only true religion 
and that all other religions are opposition (al Suri, 2010). Islamists are morally motivated 
to oppose the immoral west and its efforts to promote western ideals (Davis, 2010). 
Psychologist Philip Zimbardo (2004) has shown that de-identifying factors that exist in 
group dynamics facilitate violent behavior that otherwise might be considered deplorable. 
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“Groupthink” eases the burden on the individual to make good, moral choices. Group-
condoned, religious justification allays the natural trepidation that a lone wolf might have 
to commit a violent act alone.  
U.S. foreign policy and interests in the Middle East further antagonize extreme 
Muslims. Christopher Jasparro (2010) writes that Islamist lone wolves’ primary 
justification for violent action is anger against the United States for actions in the Middle 
East and towards Muslims. U.S. foreign and domestic policies that run counter to these 
extreme belief-systems incite lone wolves to take action against the society that represses 
them or their views (Likar, 2011). 
The degree to which group terrorist leaders and propaganda help radicalize each 
individual lone wolf is not clear; therefore, it is difficult to determine if lone wolves fight 
for the same reasons as group terrorists. Primary sources have shown that the goal of the 
extreme Islam movement is to defeat the enemy and establish Islamic rule (al Suri, 2010). 
In October 2004, al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden stated, “all we have to do is to send 
two mujahidin to the furthest point east to raise a piece of cloth on which is written ‘al-
Qaida’” in order to cause a maelstrom (Wordpress.org, 2004). It is clear that both group 
terrorists and lone wolves understand that solo, domestic violent extremism can be 
effective in promoting their minority views and causing chaos.  
Successful terrorist groups ensure that they receive rewards and advantages for 
their membership, which can include psychological rewards, such as the affirmation that 
the member is “helping the cause” (Horgan & Taylor, 2001). These groups need to 
establish a sense of belonging and commitment in their recruits to maximize their 
effectiveness, stability, and loyalty (al Suri, 2010). The question with lone wolves is 
whether or not they feel as if they are contributing to the cause in the best way by 
planning and conducting lone attacks. Conversely, it is also possible that lone wolves are 
different from group terrorists because they are seeking personal, individual glory or are 
driven by personal emotions (Sageman, 2008). Clark McCauley (2008) argues that 
individual terrorist actions are an expression of frustration that their entire perceived 
group has suffered and that terrorists are motivated by an attachment to a “greater cause.”  
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Lone-wolf terrorism is not tied to one ideology. Lone wolves typically sympathize 
with a movement, but they also harbor other underlying motivations that specifically 
affect their radicalization and their attacks (COT, 2007). A United States Institute of 
Peace report on countering radicalization noted that radicalization “is a complex and 
highly individualized process, often shaped by a poorly understood interaction of 
structural and personal factors” (Vidino, 2010, p. 3). Lone wolves, by definition, are 
terrorists who, for the most part, have radicalized, planned, and operated alone. This 
individual process means it is not possible to extricate the exact psychological factors 
present in all lone wolves. Still, this thesis attempts to identify characteristics present in a 
significant number of lone wolves.  
Christopher Hewitt (2003) notes that most extremists, and the general population 
alike, do not use violence to alter politics or policy (p. 77). However, most people who 
use violence as a means to an end are extremists. Violence is atypical behavior in most 
societies. Most people in a society strive to take actions that better their disposition, but 
would stop short at directly harming others to promote their philosophy. Lawrence Likar 
(2011) writes that terrorist acts are committed for selfish reasons to assuage the terrorists’ 
anger at a societal structure that does not accept their value system, and . argues that these 
terrorists are nihilistic. Their violent acts are committed for personal motivations and as a 
vehicle to propagate their anger and politics. Religious, ethnic, and anti-government 
rationalizations are secondary in importance. It is unclear whether this is a conscious 
decision for the lone wolf; however, it is logical to believe lone wolves have personal 
motivations for their actions due to the intrapersonal nature of their planning efforts and 
attacks. 
In Terror in the Name of God, Jessica Stern (2003) writes that a unique 
characteristic of individual terrorists is that their ideologies are created using a 
combination of existing radical ideologies and specific, personal vendettas. This belief is 
important because it allows the lone wolf to lead an individual movement similar but 
separate from terrorist group movements. Even lone terrorists who have admitted they 
wished to join a radical group are atypical when compared to group members. Lone wolf 
Jose Pimentel built pipe bombs to be used against law enforcement, military, and 
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government targets. He was arrested in November 2011 prior to conducting an attack. 
Although he was a Muslim convert who sympathized with extreme Islamist groups, 
family members believe his desire to perform violent actions began after a divorce from 
his wife (Dominican Authorities Probe U.S. Bomb Plot Suspect, 2011). Contradictory to 
his religious rationalization, Pimentel did not regularly pray or attend his local mosque 
(Flock, 2011). Lone-wolf cases are interesting because each one is vastly different. The 
lone wolf’s ideology is a combination of the entirety of his history and contexts. 
The U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
(2008) concluded that certain incendiary points are conveyed to terrorist group 
sympathizers to incite action. These points are the following. 
 The west is engaged in a war against Islam 
 Muslims are obligated to defend their religion 
 Violence is acceptable in defending the religion (Terrorist Use of the 
Internet for Strategic Communications, 2006) 
These points may incite Islamist lone wolves, but as a terrorist subset, they are 
also affected by situational conditions and their personal history and culture (Zimbardo, 
2004). 
In “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment,” Ramon Spaaij 
analyzes attributes of lone wolves across multiple countries. Spaaij (2010) attempts to 
characterize lone wolves by aggregating data and reviewing specific case studies. He 
concludes that the “mixture of causal factors is diverse and unique for each individual” 
and that a singular psychological profile is not present for all lone wolves (p. 867). He 
also writes that statistical analysis is not enough to understand the phenomenon fully (p. 
861). Still, statistical analysis may be able to show the steps, characteristics, and 
situational forces that exist in lone wolves or in successful lone-wolf style attacks. 
Psychologists who study terrorism tend to believe that situational forces and 
intrapersonal perception are more likely to determine a terrorist compared to dispositional 
forces and static characteristics, such as ethnicity or religion. Fathali Moghaddam (2007) 
argues that one’s psychological interpretations of material conditions and perceived 
options to counter these conditions are the first steps to turning to terrorism, and writes 
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that individual interpretation supersedes education and economic conditions. Experts 
agree that poor education and material conditions are not good indicators of someone’s 
likelihood of committing a terrorist act (Coogan, 2002; Foghaddam, 2007; Krueger & 
Maleckova, 2002). An example is Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan who graduated from 
medical school as a psychiatrist and achieved the rank of major in the United States 
Army.  
Studies in criminal activity may also answer questions regarding terrorism. A 
1977 study by Lee, Zimbardo, and Berthoff showed that inmates in a prison had a wide 
range of dispositional factors and characteristics. It was difficult to stereotype and profile 
the convicted felons in that prison system. It also may not be possible to typecast 
terrorists into one persona. Unfortunately, homeland security officials in the United 
States may be attempting to accomplish this. Policies have focused on short-term 
solutions to terrorism centered on individuals or groups that have completely developed 
(Foghaddam, 2007). These policies do not address foundational issues; rather, they look 
for certain factors present in recent cases. Such dispositional analyses are overly central 
in individualistic societies, such as the United States (Triandis, 1994). 
Despite the variation in motivating factors, lone wolves may hold some 
characteristics in common with other terrorists and each other. Similar to Moghaddam’s 
(2007) staircase to terrorism, a “decision tree” conceptualization of behavior may exist 
(p. 70). One factor that should be present in all lone wolves is that they should all feel as 
if the traditional government, culture, and dominant society are against their own ideals 
(Davis, 2010). Zimbardo (2004) writes that, assuming the previous statement is accurate, 
“it is neither mindless nor senseless, only a very different mindset and with different 
sensibilities” that individuals become terrorists (p. 46). Focusing on the terrorist act as 
“mindless,” “senseless,” and horrifying distorts the ability to find answers as to why 
human beings execute these actions (Horgan, 2005). This thought process makes it 
difficult to isolate the factors that cause someone to become a lone-wolf terrorist. 
Some experts have argued that psychological disorders are a factor in becoming a 
terrorist. Hewitt (2003) writes that the rate of psychological disturbance is higher in lone 
wolves than the general population. This conclusion was reached after carefully studying 
 16
cases of lone-wolf terrorism. Spaaij (2010) claims that psychological conditions could be 
a key variable in explaining why some terrorists join groups while others remain 
independent. This concept would specifically mean that a lone wolf’s social ineptitude 
might be a defining characteristic that leads to conducting actions in isolation. Jasparro 
agrees with most experts that few lone wolves fit an exact profile; however, he isolates 
similarities that lone wolves share (Spaaij, 2010). Jasparro (2010) writes, “at least nine of 
the suspected lone wolves have been described…as loners. Ten had experienced 
significant life crises…Seven…had criminal records. At least six appear to have suffered 
from mental illness” (n.p.). Despite these conclusions, recent cases of lone-wolf terrorism 
defy the theory that psychological disorders, peculiarities, and social outliers are present 
in all cases. Many recent lone wolves have been functional members of cultural and 
family groups without known psychological conditions.  
D. MODELS, POLICIES, AND THE ABILITY TO PREDICT LONE 
WOLVES 
Terrorism is a diverse phenomenon. Terrorism in the United States encapsulates 
environmental groups, right-wing extremists, anti-government activists, and extreme 
Islamists. The individuals that comprise these and other ideologies are equally diverse. It 
has been difficult for government agencies to create an accurate, universal terrorist 
profile. Simple profiling tactics without added intelligence has not been effective for law 
enforcement so far (Horgan & Taylor, 2001). Lone wolves are at least equally difficult to 
predict and identify prior to an attempted attack. Louis Beam (1992) wrote that lone 
wolves would always be difficult for authorities to capture because there “is no single 
opportunity for the Federals to destroy a significant portion of the resistance” (p. 5). 
Conversely, U.S. policy has been considerably altered after some attacks with the goal of 
eliminating future attempts. One example is Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the 
“Underwear Bomber.” He is not classified as a lone-wolf terrorist, although he did 
operationalize his attack as a lone individual. Abdulmutallab successfully boarded an 
airplane and attempted to detonate plastic explosives hidden in his undergarments. The 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) altered policy to increase screening in this 
area after the attack. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) adapted their 
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systems to be able to access multiple government organizations’ databases 
simultaneously when searching for a suspected terrorist. This adaptation and similar 
policies have been installed to find the needle in the haystack after an attempted attack 
has commenced. 
Effective policies and predictive models for preventing radicalization or stopping 
lone wolves prior to executing an attack are even more difficult to create than policies 
used to thwart commenced attacks. Horgan and Taylor (2001) write that trying to find 
models used to differentiate between terrorists and “normal” people may not be possible. 
To accomplish this, fixed qualities in an individual would need to exist that point to 
terrorism and it would be impossible to proactively go after people with a lone-wolf trait 
even if it were possible to identify (Horgan & Taylor, 2001). Individual operators are also 
difficult to detect because their planning processes have greatly varied. Some lone wolves 
may act in haste or due to emotional factors while others have spent a significant amount 
of time planning and even practicing their operation (Jasparro, 2010). It may be difficult 
to predict lone-wolf terrorism; however, research may show certain signs and 
characteristics that lone-wolf terrorists have that differ from terrorists who choose to join 
a group.  
A transparent characteristic of lone-wolf terrorism is that it occurs at a higher rate 
in the United States compared to other western countries (Hewitt, 2003; Spaaij, 2010). 
Only seven percent of all victims of terrorism in the United States were killed by lone 
wolves from 1955 to 1977; however, this portion increased to twenty-six percent from 
1978 to 1999 (Hewitt, 2003, pp. 78–79). A study published in 2010 concluded lone 
wolves conducted nearly half of all successful Islamist attacks in the United States 
(Jasparro, 2010). Marc Sageman (2008) writes that many young Muslims on the fringe of 
the salafist movement in foreign countries radicalize together as a group of peers and 
commit to jihad to find glory. Extremists in the United States may radicalize alone 
because fewer peer networks exist or law enforcement highly scrutinizes these networks. 
Individualism may also influence U.S. terrorists. Individualism is a societal norm in the 
United States defined by concern with one’s own outcome, less sharing with others, and  
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believing that one’s own outcome is independent from others (adapted from Hui & 
Triandis, 1986). U.S. homegrown terrorists may be choosing lone-wolf terrorism as a 
tactic due to cultural, situational influences. 
Domestic, individual terrorist attacks pose policy problems for the U.S. 
Government. Lone-wolf attacks are executed at random intervals, which intimidates 
society (Enders & Sandler, 2004). Lone-wolf attacks are intermittent by default because 
attacks are planned independently of each other. Problems that occur at random intervals 
are difficult to predict and prevent. Another policy problem is that no existing federal 
government organization is charged with identifying and culling recruitment of U.S. 
residents for terrorism (Bergen & Hoffman, 2010). No comprehensive policy is in place 
to reduce radicalization of lone wolves and prevent these perpetrators from attacking. 
It may be difficult to predict lone-wolf attacks. Still, even to begin forming policy 
for this subset of terrorism, policymakers need a basic understanding of the context and 
characteristics of lone wolves. Samuel Karson (as quoted in Murray, 2001) commented, 
“feelings of vulnerability can be assuaged if we deal with our weakness of not knowing 
our enemies’ intention.” Information gathering will be useful in decreasing fears and 
vulnerability to terrorism and might simultaneously aid policymakers (as quoted in 
Murray, 2001). 
E. CRITIQUE OF LITERATURE AND CONCLUSION 
Lone-wolf terrorism has become a more significant threat to the United States. 
The number of small-scale terrorist attacks is increasing and lone wolves conduct the 
highest percentage of these attacks. Still, only a few of the analyzed articles’ subjects 
were directly related to lone-wolf terrorism. The literature lacked cohesive conclusions 
regarding why some terrorists choose the lone-wolf tactic while others join groups. It did 
not identify common steps and processes that lone-wolf terrorists take prior to conducting 
an attack. Such guidance in the literature would help government policy intended to 
interfere with these steps, and then abate lone-wolf terrorism before a deadly attack could 
occur. 
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Many questions remain unanswered regarding lone-wolf terrorism. It is not 
known if these attacks are completely isolated, random events or if certain factors play a 
role. It is also not known if certain characteristics exist in a significant number of lone-
wolf cases and if these characteristics affect the potential for their success. The current 
literature addresses the lone-wolf tactic and the benefits of a terrorist using it; however, a 
statistical analysis is necessary to lay the groundwork of understanding of lone-wolf 
terrorism. In this thesis, a statistical analysis of lone-wolf terrorism is conducted and 
synthesized with important findings in the current literature to form a robust 
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III.  METHODS 
A. INTRODUCTION AND DATA COLLECTION 
A large cadre of literature on the subject of lone-wolf terrorism is non-existent. 
The need exists for a comprehensive study of all lone wolves since 9/11. A problem with 
the current literature is that most of these studies focus on only a few cases of specific 
lone wolves. A quantitative statistical analysis of lone-wolf attackers does not exist. This 
analysis is necessary to create a basic understanding of the phenomenon of lone-wolf 
terrorism. Factually based policy and strategy to curtail individual terrorism can only be 
effectively formulated once this analysis is accomplished. 
Quantitative, qualitative, and descriptive statistical analysis are used to examine 
data on lone-wolf terrorism in this thesis. The author compiled a list of lone-wolf attacks 
and attempts using open-source information and existing, vetted databases that include 
the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base and the University of Maryland Study of 
Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START) Global Terrorism Database (GTD). 
These databases are home to a comprehensive list of terrorist attacks. The total set of 
terrorist data is filtered by: time (attacks after 9/11), geography (the United States), and 
the definition of lone-wolf terrorism defined for the purpose of this research. Applying 
these filters yielded fifty-three lone-wolf attacks that are analyzed. 
A standardized list of information to be collected on each lone-wolf case was 
created. Individual characteristic questions were created to ensure that the information 
gathered by the researcher could be fairly compared across lone-wolf cases. Table 3.1 
lists the information categories, questions, and explanations. These fields were populated 
by researching existing literature and open-source material. The latter includes previous 





Category Question Answer Explanation 
Name What is the name of the terrorist? String  
Date When was the date on which the attack 
occurred? 
String For foiled cases or attempted attacks, 
the date is the day of arrest 
Month During which month did the attack occur? String  
Season During which season did the attack occur String Winter: December 21 – March 20 
Spring: March 21 – June 20 
Summer: June 21 – September 20 
Fall: September 21 – December 20 
Day of Week Did the attack occur on a weekday or 
weekend? 
String Weekday: Monday, Tuesday, 
Wednesday, Thursday, Friday 
Weekend: Saturday, Sunday 
State In which U.S. State did the attack occur? String Includes all fifty U.S. States and the 
District of Columbia 
Latitudinal 
Region 
In what region of the country did the attack 
occur? 
North, south Based on state’s geographic location 
Longitudinal 
Region 
In what region of the country did the attack 
occur? 
East, west Based on state’s geographic location 
Target What type of target was the terrorist 
attacking? 





 Attacks can have multiple targets 
Deaths How many deaths were directly caused by the 
successful attack? 
Number of people  Suicide by attacker was included in total 
number of deaths 
Casualties How many people were injured due to the 
attack? 
Number of people  
Weapon What was the weapon used by the terrorist? Biological, 
explosive, 
firearm, vehicle 
 Attacks can have multiple weapons 
Foiled Did law enforcement or another agency 
proactively prevent the attack? 
Yes, no Foiled attacks are defined as ones that 
are not successful due to intervention 
A foiled attack cannot be successful or 
include deaths 
Success Did the terrorist succeed at accomplishing his 
goal? 
Yes, no A successful attack is one in which the 
lone-wolf terrorist accomplishes his 
main objective, as determined by the 
researcher 
Any attack that directly caused deaths 
is considered successful 
Age How old was the terrorist at the time of the 
attack/arrest? 
Number in years  
Gender What is the gender of the terrorist? Male, female  
Ideology What was the political ideology of the 
terrorist? 
String  
Religion What were the terrorist’s religious beliefs at 
the time of the attack? 
String  
Conversion Is there evidence that shows the terrorist had Yes, no  
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Category Question Answer Explanation 
converted religions in the past? 
Ancestry From what country is the terrorist’s ancestry? String  
Employment Was the terrorist employed at the time of the 
attack? 
Yes, no  
Psychological 
problems 
Did the terrorist have any known 
psychological problems at the time of the 
attack? 
Yes, no “Yes” was recorded if any clinically 
diagnosed psychological problems existed 
or if family members suggested 
psychological problems existed 
Time since 
last event 








Did the terrorist attempt to or actually meet 
with other extremists? 
Yes, no “Yes” was recorded if the terrorist met with 




Did the terrorist attack a person or place of 
interest or the general public? 




Did the terrorist have previous contact with 
known extremists? 
Yes, no  
Group Has the terrorist ever been a member of a 
terrorist group?  
Yes, no  
Suicide Was the attack a suicide? Yes, no  
Distance from 
home 
How far was the planned attack from the 
terrorist’s residence? 
Number of miles  
Internet Did the terrorist use the Internet to radicalize, 
plan, or promote the attack or his ideology? 
Yes, no  
Table 3.1. Data Collection Categories 
The completed spreadsheet allows for a unique, comprehensive analysis of lone-
wolf attacks and the relationship that certain characteristics have on these attacks and the 
perpetrators. The analysis and associated graphs illustrate these relationships, patterns, 
and descriptions.  
Appropriate statistical tests were used to measure correlation, significance, and 
number of events. At least five analysis types were used: univariate analysis, bivariate 
analysis, linear regression, binomial distribution analysis, and descriptive statistics. The 
exact test and regression models were applied based on the specific characteristics to be 
studied and their relationship with other statistics. A statistical software program was 
used to ensure that the best model for regressions ran a stepwise selection of variables. 
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Univariate analysis is one in which each collected characteristic is analyzed 
independently from the other characteristics to form a baseline of information for the 
population. Graphical analysis involves visualizing variables within this data set. This 
simple approach graphically demonstrates the data and shows an initial estimate of the 
involved distributions. Qualitative statistics, such as geography of attack, gender, and 
religion of the lone wolf, are presented in pie charts and other graphs to give the reader a 
historical understanding of lone-wolf attacks since 9/11. Table 3.2 lists the characteristics 
analyzed graphically in this thesis. 
Descriptive statistics explain the data. Tables are provided to show the total 
occurrences of each characteristic field. Quantitative data is also presented in tabular 
form with statistics, such as the mean, median, minimum, maximum, variance and 
standard deviation for each characteristic type. 
Correlation and linear regression analyze the association and correlation between 
multiple variables represented by quantitative data. Table 3.3 shows how each 
characteristic was analyzed as a function of other characteristics to determine if patterns 
of characteristics in lone-wolf terrorism occur. For correlation, the association is 
evaluated using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (r). 
Binomial distribution analysis determines the probability that one of two events 
occur with greater likelihood than the other. An example would be using this model to 
find the likelihood of an attack being successful with casualties under the assumption that 
an attempt has occurred. Table 3.4 shows the type of x and y variable pairings analyzed 
using binomial distribution testing. 
Both quantitative characteristics, such as age and number of casualties caused by 
attacks, and binomial characteristics, such as if the attack was successful or not, are 
analyzed in this study. The set of binomial characteristics and the set of quantitative 




binary characteristic is present or not, e.g., if a significant average age difference exists in 
successful attacks compared to unsuccessful attacks. Table 3.5 shows the set of 
quantitative variables compared to binomial characteristics. 
B.  UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Univariate analysis is the analysis of a single variable and the description of that 
variable’s attributes. Each characteristic in this section is analyzed and presented 
independently. Quantifiable integers are presented in a table along with each variable’s 
statistical summary. Qualitative characteristics are presented in chart form. The following 
tables show each characteristic analyzed. The exploratory data analyses show patterns of 












a Month January February March April… 
b Season Winter Spring Summer Fall 
c Weekday Weekday Weekend   
d State Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas… 
e Latitudinal Region North South   
f Longitudinal Region East West   
g Target POI Building Infrastructure Public… 
h Weapon Used Firearm Explosive Biological Vehicle… 
i Foiled Yes No   
j Success Yes No   





m Religion Christianity Islam Judaism Hinduism 
n Employment Status Employed Unemployed   
o Psychological State Psychological 
factors present 
Not present   
p Country of Birth United States Mexico Canada Israel… 
q Attempted to Meet Fellow 
Extremists 
Yes No   
r Targeted a Specific Person Yes No   
s Contact with Extremists Yes No   
t Previously in Extremist Group Yes No   
u Suicide Attempt? Suicide Long-term 
Campaign 
  
v Used Internet to radicalize or 
promote interests 
Yes No   
Table 3.2. Characteristics Analyzed Graphically 
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C.  BIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Table 3.3 shows each characteristic analyzed as a function of other characteristics 
to determine if patterns of characteristics in lone-wolf terrorism exist, which are analyzed 
using linear regression. Each white box illustrates one scatterplot graph analyzed using 
linear regression. 
 























Age (years)     
Time Since Religious 
Conversion (months) 
    
Distance from home (# of 
miles) 
    
Deaths (#)     
Table 3.3. Bivariate Analysis Characteristics 
D.  BINOMIAL DISTRIBUTION ANALYSIS 
Binomial tests are used to find the probability that a binary outcome occurs given 
another event and evaluates that against the assumption that the binary characteristic is 
equally likely to be yes/no or 1/0. A white box in Table 3.4 indicates an instance for 








































Attack?                
Successful?                
Suicide 
Attack? 
               
Travel?                
Employed?                
Married?                
Attacked 
person of int.? 
               
Born in U.S.?                
Weekday?                
Psychological 
problems? 
               
Contact with 
extremists? 
               
Conversion?                
Previously in 
group? 
               
Casualties?                
Firearm?                
Table 3.4. Binomial Distribution Analysis Characteristics 
E.  CHARACTERISTIC COMPARISON 
The set of binomial characteristics and the set of quantitative characteristics are 
compared using summary statistics to establish any quantitative differences that may 
occur if a binary characteristic is present or not. A white box in the Table 3.5 indicates a 























Travel to attack point? 
A





















             
Number of 
Deaths 
             
Distance 
traveled 
             
Table 3.5. Binomial Distribution Analysis Characteristics 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Data have been collected for the fifty-three cases of lone-wolf terrorism in the 
United States since 9/11. Information relating to thirty-two characteristics has been 
collected on each of the fifty-three cases. The following section is a univariate analysis of 
each of these characteristics. A univariate analysis is one in which each collected 
characteristic is analyzed independently from the other characteristics to form a baseline 




Total Mean Median Minimum Maximum Variance Standar
d 
D i tiDeaths 
[N=53] 
34 0.64 0 0 13 3.85 1.96 
Casualties 
[N=53] 
95 1.79 0 0 32 29.25 5.41 
Age (years) 
[N=46] 
 35.44 34.5 15 88 213.45 14.61 
Time Since Last Event 
(months) 
[N=53] 
 2.25 2 0 8 3.80 1.95 
Distance Traveled (miles) 
[N=36] 
 76.14 17.5 0 811 26614.24 163.14 
Table 4.1. Univariate Analysis of the Quantitative Characteristics of Lone-wolf 
Terrorists in the United States Since 9/11 
1. Quantitative Characteristics 
Lone-wolf attacks continue to occur and have been occurring regularly. The 
median average of time between attacks is only two months for the population in this 
study. As described in the literature review, these terrorists come from a diverse 
background, have many different dispositions, and often times, mix personal grievances 




population is 35.44 years old. A high variance for these attackers occurs. The youngest is 
a fifteen-year-old high school student while the oldest is an eighty-eight-year-old World 
War II veteran. 
Lone-wolf attacks create and spread terror; however, relatively few cases have 
caused casualties in the public. Only eleven cases have resulted in the murders of U.S. 
residents. The mean average number of deaths for each lone-wolf attack is only 0.64 
deaths. Nidal Hassan’s attack at Fort Hood caused thirteen deaths, the highest number of 
deaths caused by a lone wolf since 9/11 in the United States The number of casualties in 
the attacks is slightly higher. The average attack has resulted in 1.79 non-fatal injuries. 
The population of lone-wolf terrorists traveled an average of 76.14 miles to 
attack. The range for this characteristic was quite high. One lone wolf traveled 811 miles 
while many lone wolves attempted their attack in the same city or town of their residence.  
2. Time Characteristics 
The large number of recent lone-wolf cases has caused greater attention to this 
phenomenon in the U.S. media and from the country’s politicians. Fifty-three cases have 
occurred in the decade since 9/11 with a mean average of only 2.25 months in between 
attempted attacks. At least one attack has occurred in every calendar month of the year 
and the data suggest no significant increase or decrease in these attacks by each 
individual month. The winter, spring, summer, and fall seasons have all had at least 
eleven but no more than sixteen attacks. The majority of lone-wolf attacks have occurred 
during a traditional weekday as opposed to a weekend. Eighty-seven percent of the 
attacks, attempts, and arrests studied occurred on a weekday, which exceeds the seventy-





Figure 4.1. Number of Lone-wolf Attacks by the Day of Week 
3. Geographic Location and Area Characteristics 
A lone-wolf terrorist does not need to reside near a terrorist group or in any 
particular city, state, or region in the United States. Attempts and attacks have occurred 
throughout the country. The geographic region in which the most attacks have transpired 
is the southeast. This region includes the District of Columbia and Maryland, which have 
experienced a relatively high number of lone-wolf attacks. Still, a similar amount of 
attacks have occurred in the northeast and southwest regions. The northwest region has 
experienced significantly fewer attacks; however, this may be at least partially explained 
by the fact that this region has the smallest population included within its boundaries. 
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N=64 (includes attacks that occurred in multiple states) 
Figure 4.2. Lone-wolf Attacks by State 
Generally, the number of attacks in each state mirrors the state’s population in 
relation to the United States. The largest states by population have typically had more 
attacks than the smallest states. Texas, New York, and Florida, which have high 
populations, have had eighteen total cases of lone-wolf terrorism. Less-populous North 
Dakota, South Dakota, and Rhode Island are among the twenty-eight states that have 
none. Notable exceptions do occur to this general concept. The District of Columbia 
(D.C.) has experienced seven attacks and yet comprises only 0.2 percent of the U.S. 
population, although, many people live in the suburban area around D.C. Still, the 
disparity is the largest of any jurisdiction. Colorado, Maryland, Tennessee, and Arkansas 
also have had a disparately high number of attacks in relation to their populations. 
Conversely, California, whose citizens’ account for over twelve percent of the U.S. 
population, has been terrorized by a lone wolf only four times since 9/11. Pennsylvania 
and Michigan have a disproportionally low number of attacks in relation to their state 
populations, as well. 
Lone wolves target different areas and types of people based on their objectives 
during their attempted terror attacks. Many lone wolves desire to kill as many people as 
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possible, while others endeavor to destroy symbolic buildings or infrastructure. Fewer 
attempt to assassinate a specific person of interest or VIP target. Twenty-four of the fifty-
six known targets have been buildings, twenty-one have been U.S. residents considered 
part of the general public, and eight have targeted person or specific places of interest. 
Two others have targeted infrastructure, which include a plot to destroy oil energy 
installations and a lone wolf who attempted to disable a subway system. Only one case 
occurred in which the target is unknown. This case involved an Egyptian man who was 




Figure 4.3. Target of Lone-wolf Attacks 
4. Attacker Disposition and Personal Attributes 
Lone wolves have many different dispositions, characteristics, and ideologies; 
however, some attributes occur at a high rate. Forty-eight lone wolves have been men, 
which is an overwhelming majority and clearly shows that the population of extremists 
willing to conduct violent acts to achieve political goals in the United States is male. The 
remaining five cases’ gender is not known. Each of these cases is still considered a lone 
wolf due to certain factors in each case. For example, in one case, a security video 
recording shows a lone actor, but the gender cannot be clearly identified. 
 34
The next most prominent characteristic is the terrorist’s country of birth. Seventy-
three percent (N=32) of all lone wolves in the study were born in the United States. All 
other countries combined equal only twenty-seven percent (N=12) and no other country 
appears more than twice as a lone-wolf’s place of birth. All lone wolves have resided in 
the United States for at least a short period of time. No documented cases exist of an 
international lone actor entering the country to enact an immediate attack.  
Lone terrorists have supported a large variety of ideologies. Many have had 
philosophies that mix personal vendettas with established ideologies. Almost every lone 
wolf has directed his anger at an authority figure or idea, such as the government or a 
hated race. The most prominent ideology is anti-government sentiment. Twenty-nine 
lone-wolf terrorists primarily espouse this ideology. The next most cited ideology is 
Islamist extremism, which has been the primary ideology in nineteen cases. Seven lone-
wolf attacks have been justified by terrorists whose ideologies are racist. Figure 4.4 
shows the proportion of primary ideologies for the lone-wolf population. Multiple key 














Figure 4.4. Ideology of Lone Wolves 
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The literature shows that terrorists need not be disadvantaged to turn to terrorism. 
Characteristics of the population of lone wolves in the United States since 9/11 reaffirm 
this finding. Of the twenty-seven cases for which educational background is known, 
sixteen had attended college. Fifty-four percent had at least a high school degree and an 
additional thirty-five percent had graduated from a university. Known, open-source data 
does exist on the employment status of thirty-four of the cases. At least fourteen of the 
lone wolves were employed at the time of their attempted attack. 
Some previous studies on terrorism and lone-wolf terrorism have focused on the 
mental state of the perpetrator. It may be true that lone wolves have a higher occurrence 
of mental disorder in comparison to the general population (Spaaij, 2010); however, most 
lone wolves are not “crazy,” are not diagnosed with a disorder, and have no signs of 
mental incapacitation. For this study, a lone wolf was categorized as having a mental 
disorder upon meeting any of the following conditions. 
 A documented history of mental disorder exists 
 The person self reports a mental disorder at time of arrest1 
 A family member or acquaintance reports that the lone wolf may have 
been mentally disturbed, including showing signs of a mood disorder, such 
as depression 
Ten lone wolves met at least one criterion for having a mental disorder. At least 
twenty-nine of the cases did not meet any of the criteria. None of the most recent 
eighteen cases have exhibited a mental illness or been reported as having a previously 
known mental disorder. 
                                                 
1 An insanity defense at trial does not automatically categorize the lone wolf as having a mental 
disorder. 
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5. Success and Mode of Attack 
 
N=25 
Figure 4.5. Number and Percentage of Successful Lone-wolf Attacks by Year 
A number of lone-wolf attacks have been successfully executed in the United 
States since 9/11. A successful attack is one in which the terrorist accomplishes his main 
objective. Any attack that causes direct casualties is considered a successful attack, but 
attacks that do not cause deaths or injuries can be successful if other goals are met. 
Twenty-five of the fifty-three lone wolves have successfully executed their plans. These 
twenty-five successes have only directly killed thirty-four people, which may be due to at 
least two reasons. First, the lone wolf may have not properly executed his attack due to 
insufficient planning or weapons that malfunctioned during the attack. Second, law 
enforcement or another government agency may have intervened prior to the successful 
execution of an attack. Twenty-four of the cases studied have not been successful due to 
the direct intervention of an outside party. Authorities have foiled nine out of the last ten 
cases of lone-wolf terrorism. Authorities are not able to intervene in all lone-wolf cases 
because these terrorists plan and operate in isolation. The number of successful attacks 
and percentage of attacks varies each year. Since a high of six successful attacks in 2009, 
the percentage of successful attacks and total number of successful lone-wolf attacks 




Figure 4.6. Weapon Used by Lone Wolf 
Different types of weapons have been used to conduct lone-wolf style attacks. 
Fifty-nine weapons have been used in the cases studied, which is possible because some 
lone wolves used multiple weapon types. The most common weapon of choice is an 
explosive device or bomb. Thirty-two attackers detonated, attempted to use, or planned to 
use a bomb. In fact, fourteen of the last sixteen lone-wolves’ primary weapon was a 
bomb. Seventeen lone wolves have used a firearm, which includes handguns, rifles, and 
machine guns. Five used a vehicle to attack persons or places, which consists of 
automobiles and airplanes. Four terrorists used a biological or chemical weapon to 
include actual or perceived anthrax, ricin, and sarin gas. Only one terrorist used a knife 
that was used in conjunction with an explosive device. 
A small percentage of lone-wolf terrorists have incorporated suicide tactics in 
their attack method. Ninety-one percent (N=48) of lone wolves have not attempted to or 
successfully committed suicide. Only nine percent (N=5) of lone wolves have attempted 
to commit suicide. Only three successful suicide attacks have been perpetrated by lone-
wolf extremists during which the lone wolf has committed suicide or been killed in an 
apparent purposeful “death by law enforcement.” The ideologies of the five suicide 
attackers are mixed—four different ideologies comprise the five attackers. 
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6. Contact with Extremists 
The definition of lone-wolf terrorism does not preclude the person from having 
been a member of a terrorist group prior to becoming a lone actor; however, very few 
members of the population in this study had previously been affiliated with a group. In 
fact, ninety-three percent (N=43) of the population for whom data are available had never 
been a member of a terrorist group. Lone-wolf terrorists rarely attempted to meet other 
extremists for any kind of support prior to or during the planning period for their attacks. 
Only eight out of forty-five lone wolves had known contact with other extremists, which 
includes indirect contact over the Internet and direct, face-to-face contact. A higher 
percentage of lone actors attempted to meet other extremists before, during, or after their 
terrorist attack. Twenty-seven percent (N=12) of lone wolves for whom data are available 
attempted to meet at least one other extremist. The contacts were not directly involved in 
planning or operating the terrorist attack and this number includes cases in which U.S. 
law enforcement officials posed as extremists in an undercover operation. 
7. The Internet 
 
N=17 
Figure 4.7. Number of Lone Wolves That Used the Internet by Year 
Many of the lone wolves who contacted ideologically similar extremists did so 
over the Internet, which grants anonymity and a medium through which the lone wolf can 
contact international extremists with relative ease. The U.S. Senate Committee on 
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Homeland Security and Government Affairs (2008) has found that the Internet offers the 
most accessible source of passive and interactive information to terrorists. Seventeen of 
forty-six (37%) lone wolves actively learned or disseminated extremist ideologies on the 
Internet, which includes online radicalization, contact with extremists through the 
Internet, and posting extreme propaganda. The use of the Internet continues to be a 
predominant trend in lone-wolf terrorism in the United States. The highest percentage of 
lone wolves used the Internet in 2011. Five of the six cases directly used the Internet in 
2011. The number and percentage of total cases that have actively used the Internet has 
increased since 2008. 
B.  BIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Quantitative data were collected for the age of the terrorist, number of months 
since the terrorist’s religious conversion (if applicable), the number of deaths caused in 
the attack, the number of casualties caused in the attack, and the number of miles traveled 
to attack. The following section is a bivariate analysis of these data. A bivariate analysis 
is one in which two characteristics are analyzed together to determine the relationship 
between them. 
 
X-variable Y-variable Number of Cases r2 Value 
Age of conversion Time since 
conversion 
6 -0.124 
Age Distance traveled 36 0.073 
Age Number of deaths in 
success 
13 0.00 
Age Number of deaths in 
attempt 
46 0.037 
Distance traveled Number of deaths in 
success 
13 -0.104 
Table 4.2. Bivariate Analysis of the Quantitative Characteristics of Lone-wolf 
Terrorists in the United States since 9/11 
The quantitative variables collected in this study have relatively weak associations 
with each other. The age of the lone wolf and the number of deaths in a successful attack 
had no correlation at all. Age and the number of deaths in the forty-six attacks for which 
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data were present is very weakly associated and produced a correlation coefficient (r2) of 
0.037. This increases to 0.118 if the case of Nidal Hassan, in which thirteen individuals 
were killed, is removed. A slight positive correlation occurs between age and the number 
of miles traveled to attack. As a trend, older lone-wolf terrorists have traveled further to 
commit their crime in comparison to younger attackers. The r2 value is 0.073 for these 
variables; however, this number increases to 0.135 if the outlier case involving an eighty-
eight-year-old lone wolf is removed. Further travel is not a positive indicator of success 
in terms of number of deaths—a negative association exists between the distance traveled 
to attack and the number of deaths in a success. The correlation coefficient for this pair of 
variables is -0.104. The strongest correlation seen is between the age of religious 
conversion and the time since the terrorist converted. Older terrorists tended to be 
associated with a shorter amount of time since their conversion from when the attack 





Figure 4.8. Distance Traveled by Lone Wolf to Attack by Age 
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C.  BINOMIAL DISTRIBUTION ANALYSIS 
Binomial distribution tests are used to analyze the number of successes in a 
sequence of results in which the only two possibilities are either a success or failure. For 
this study, binomial tests are used to find the probability that a binary outcome occurs 
given another event and evaluates that against the assumption that the binary 
characteristic is equally likely to be yes/no or 1/0. 
1. Binomial Distribution Tables 
Table 4.3 displays the results of the binomial distribution analysis for the fifty-
three cases of lone-wolf terrorism in the United States since 9/11. The first column is a 
list of characteristics collected and the number of times that this characteristic appeared 
out of the fifty-three total cases. The first row lists the same characteristics. The purpose 
of the binomial distribution analysis is to compare which characteristics occur a high or 
low number of times given that another characteristic is present. The integer listed in 
each cell of the table is the number of times that the characteristic in the corresponding 
top row has occurred given that the characteristic in the leftmost column is present. An 
example is written as follows. 
 Given that there have been [#] times that [first column characteristic] has 
occurred; there have been [# in corresponding cell] times that [first row 
characteristic] has occurred. 
 Given that there have been fifty-three attacks; there have been twenty-five 
times that they have been successful. 
The characteristics listed in the first row and column are considered binomial 
because each characteristic either occurs or does not occur in each of the fifty-three lone-
wolf cases. A binomial distribution test was run for each characteristic, which produces a 
lower and upper quantile range for the number of times that each characteristic in the top 
row can occur assuming that the characteristic in the first column has occurred. In other 
words, given n number of occurrences of a certain characteristic, this test shows the 
minimum and maximum number of occurrences that a second characteristic could appear 
to be 95% confident that the second characteristic has an equal chance (p=0.5) of 
occurring. For example, given that seventeen attacks used a firearm, the lower quantile 
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range is five and the upper quantile range is twelve. Eleven of the attacks using a firearm 
were successful and is within the range. In other words, an attack using a firearm may 
have been equally likely to be successful as not successful. On the other hand, only one 
of the attacks using a firearm was a suicide attack, which falls well below the lower 
quantile range; therefore, the possibility is rejected that a suicide attack has been equally 
likely as a non-suicide attack for lone-wolf terrorists using a firearm. 
A green cell in the Table 4.3 indicates a characteristic that falls within the quantile 
range. A yellow cell indicates that the number of occurrences of a characteristic is one 
outside the range. A red cell indicates that the number of occurrences is more than two 
outside the range and the characteristic in the top row’s probability of occurring is not 
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 25 5 27 14 4 24 33 46 10 8 3 10 17 32 
Successful 
N=25 
  3 13 6 3 10 17 21 7 3 2 10 11 9 
Travel 
N=27 
 13 3  5 1 12 20 22 7 3 3 5 11 16 
Employed  
N=14 
 6 2 5  3 5 11 13 2 5 1 4 6 7 
Attacked person of interest 
N=24 
 10 2 12 5 2  13 21 4 3 1 2 4 17 
Born in U.S.  
N=33 
 17 4 20 11 3 13  28 9 8 3 8 14 20 
Weekday  
N=46 
 21 4 22 13 4 20 28  8 7 2 9 13 30 
Psychological problems 
N=10 
 7 2 7 2 2 4 9 8  2 1 5 4 4 
Contact with extremists  
N=8 
 3 1 3 5 2 3 8 7 2  2 2 4 5 
Casualties  
N=10 
 10* 1 5 4 3 2 8 9 5 2 0  6 1 
Firearm  
N=17 
 11 1 11 6 3 4 14 13 4 4 2 6   
Bomb  
N=32 
 9 1 16 7 1 17 20 30 4 5 1 1   
 
Characteristic is within range by 2+ Characteristic is within range by 1 
Characteristic is within range by 0 or outside of range by +/- 1 
Characteristic is outside of range by 2-3  Characteristic is outside of range by 4+ 
Table 4.3. Binomial Distribution Analysis of Characteristics of Lone-wolf Terrorists in the United States Since 9/11 
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Table 4.4 is the same binomial distribution analysis presented differently. The cell 
values that fall within the quantile range have been blacked out. The remaining cells in 
blue are below the lower quantile and the cells in orange are above the higher quantile. 
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 25 5 27 14 4 24 33 46 10 8 3 10 17 32 
Successful 
N=25 
  3 13 6 3 10 17 21 7 3 2 10 11 9 
Travel 
N=27 
 13 3  5 1 12 20 22 7 3 3 5 11 16 
Employed  
N=14 
 6 2 5  3 5 11 13 2 5 1 4 6 7 
Attacked person of interest 
N=24 
 10 2 12 5 2  13 21 4 3 1 2 4 17 
Born in U.S.  
N=33 
 17 4 20 11 3 13  28 9 8 3 8 14 20 
Weekday  
N=46 
 21 4 22 13 4 20 28  8 7 2 9 13 30 
Psychological problems 
N=10 
 7 2 7 2 2 4 9 2  2 1 5 4 4 
Contact with extremists  
N=8 
 3 1 3 5 2 3 8 8 2  2 2 4 5 
Casualties  
N=10 
 10* 1 5 4 3 2 8 9 5 2 0  6 1 
Firearm  
N=17 
 11 1 11 6 3 4 14 13 4 4 2 6   
Bomb  
N=32 
 9 1 16 7 1 17 20 30 4 5 1 1   
 
Characteristic is 2+ below minimum Characteristic falls on minimum or 1 below 
Characteristic falls on maximum or 1 above Characteristic is 2+ above maximum 
Table 4.4. Binomial Distribution Analysis of Characteristics of Lone-wolf Terrorists in the United States Since 9/11 
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2. The Relationship Between Lone-wolf Attacks and Other 
Characteristics 
This section examines the prominence of each of the characteristics assuming that 
an attack has occurred. Some characteristics are within the quantile range of the binomial 
distribution analysis. In other words, it is fair to assume that this characteristic may have 
been about equally likely to occur during an attack as to not occur, which is the case with 
the likelihood of success. Twenty-five cases have been successful and fall in the middle 
of the quantile range. Employment at the time of attack and the target being a person or 
place of interest (POI) also are within the quantile range. Thus, the probability of a lone-
wolf terrorist within the population of the study may have been about even to have been 
employed or unemployed, attacked a POI or the general public, and been successful or 
unsuccessful. 
Many characteristics of an attack occur for which it is unlikely that the probability 
was p=0.5 according to the statistical analyses. Certain characteristics for which it is 
likely that the probability of them occurring during a lone-wolf attack is much below fifty 
percent. These characteristics are suicide tactics, marriage, psychological disorder, 
contact with extremists, previous membership in a terrorist group, casualties occurring in 
an attack, and a firearm being used in an attack. 
Some characteristics of an attack occur for which the probability is higher than 
p=0.5. The characteristic whose total number of occurrences is the highest above the 
upper quantile limit is travel. In other words, a lone wolf has likely had a much better 
chance of traveling to attack than staying stagnant; although, lone wolves who stay closer 
to home have caused more casualties in their attacks. The additional characteristics that 
are higher than the upper limit are being born in the United States, the attack occurring on 
a weekday2, and an explosive device or bomb being used in the attack. 
                                                 
2 The quantile ranges were weighted appropriately for weekday/weekend data to account for the fact 
that there are five weekdays in a week and only two weekend days. 
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3. The Relationship Between Successful Attacks and Other 
Characteristics 
Many characteristics fall within the appropriate quantile range to make it fair to 
say that they may have been about equally likely to occur as to not occur during 
successful lone-wolf attacks. These characteristics are travel, employment, marriage, 
attacking a POI, having a reported psychological disorder, casualties during the attack, 
and the use of a firearm and explosive device. Thus, these characteristics, in a successful 
attack, may have been about equally likely to be present or not present. 
Suicide tactics, previously being a member of a terrorist group, and having 
contact with extremists were less likely to be present in successful terrorist attacks; 
although, these characteristics also appear less frequently in all cases of lone-wolf 
terrorism studied. 
Two interesting characteristics are seen a much higher number of times than the 
upper quantile limit. It is unlikely that the probability was as low as fifty percent for a 
lone wolf to be born in the United States in a successful attack. It is also unlikely that the 
probability was as low as fifty percent for a lone wolf to attack on a weekday in a 
successful attack. Many lone wolves who successfully attacked have been born in the 
U.S. and attacked on a weekday. 
4. The Relationship Between Travel and Other Characteristics 
Twenty-seven individuals traveled outside of their town or city to commence an 
attack. In these cases, the characteristics that fall within the quantile range are success, 
attacking a POI, the attack transpiring on a weekday, the weapon being a firearm, and the 
weapon being a bomb. It is fair to say that these characteristics may have been equally 
likely to be present given that a lone wolf traveled to commence his attack.  
The characteristics that fall below the lower limit of the range are suicide, 
employment, marriage, psychological problems, having previous contact with extremists, 




attack. These characteristics have existed in few enough cases in which the terrorist has 
traveled that it is unlikely that the probability of them occurring was as high as fifty 
percent. 
The only characteristic significantly higher than the upper limit of the quantile 
range was being born in the United States. Twenty of the traveling lone-wolf population 
for whom a birth country is known were born in the United States. 
5. The Relationship Between Employment and Other Characteristics 
Research has shown that at least fourteen lone wolves were employed when they 
commenced their attack. Within this population, the characteristics that fall within the 
quantile range and whose probability may be about equal are success, travel, marriage, 
attacking a POI, contact with extremists, firearm used, and a bomb or explosive device 
being used. Employment is the only characteristic for which direct contact with 
extremists is not below the minimum quantile range. 
The presence of suicide tactics, psychological problems, membership in a terrorist 
group, and casualties are below the lower limit range. Therefore, the probability of these 
characteristics being seen in the employed lone wolf was probably less than fifty percent. 
6. The Relationship Between Attack a Person or Place of Interest and 
Other Characteristics 
Twenty-four lone wolves in the United States targeted a POI. These targets were 
either a specific very important person or a symbolic building or area. Many of the 
characteristics gathered fall just outside of the quantile range. The only two 
characteristics within the range are success and employment. It is reasonable to suggest 
that the lone wolves who targeted POIs were about as likely to succeed as to fail and 
about as likely to be employed as to be unemployed. 
Suicide tactics, psychological disorder, prior contact with extremists, previous 
membership in a terrorist group, casualties in the attack, and using a firearm all occurred 
fewer times than the lower range limit. 
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The population of lone wolves who focused on a POI traveled to attack, was born 
in the United States, attacked on a weekday, and used an explosive device a greater 
number of times than the upper limit. 
7. The Relationship Between Being Born in the United States of America 
and Other Characteristics 
As the reader might hypothesize, the majority of lone-wolf terrorists in the United 
States have been born there. Thirty-three members of the population studied for whom 
birth data are available meet this criterion. The characteristics that appear a number of 
times within the quantile range are success, employment, attacking a POI, the use of a 
firearm in the attack, and using a bomb during the attack. 
Suicide tactics, psychological disorder, prior contact with extremists, previous 
membership in a terrorist group, and casualties in the attack occurred fewer times than 
the lower range limit. The probability of these characteristics existing given that the lone 
wolf was born in the United States may have been less than fifty percent for each case. 
Traveling to attack and attacking on a weekday are the two characteristics that 
appeared a significantly high number of times. Twenty-eight of the thirty-three lone 
wolves born in the United States attacked on a weekday. This reached the upper limit of 
the quantile range. Twenty lone wolves born in the United States traveled to their attack 
point, which was above the upper limit. 
8. The Relationship Between an Attack Occurring on a Weekday and 
Other Characteristics 
A large percentage of attacks commenced between Monday and Friday. Forty-six 
of the fifty-three attacks occurred on a weekday. During these attack attempts, the 
number of times that the characteristics success, employment, and attacking a POI falls 
within the quantile range. It is fair to say that these characteristics, given that an attack 
has occurred on a weekday, may have been equally likely to be seen as not seen. 
Suicide tactics, psychological disorder, prior contact with extremists, previous 
membership in a terrorist group, casualties in the attack, and the use of a firearm occurred  
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fewer times than the lower range limit. The probability of these characteristics existing 
given that the lone wolf proceeded with the plan on a weekday may have been less than 
fifty percent for each case. 
Conversely, workweek attackers used a bomb, were born in the United States, and 
traveled to their attack point a greater number of times than the maximum quantile. 
9. The Relationship Between Reported Psychological Disorder and 
Other Characteristics 
Psychological disorder alone is not enough to explain the phenomenon of lone-
wolf terrorism. Still, ten of the fifty-three lone-wolf terrorists in the United States since 
9/11 have been reported as having a psychological disorder. This small population means 
that the quantile range will be a large percentage of the possible population. The 
minimum threshold is two and maximum is eight. Success, employment, marriage, 
attacking a POI, attacking on a weekday, casualties, using a firearm, and using a bomb all 
fall within this range. 
Committing or attempting to commit suicide and having contact with a fellow 
extremist fall on the lower range. Only one case occurs in which the lone-wolf terrorist 
had a known psychological disorder and was previously a member of a terrorist group. 
This case is consistent with previous studies that demonstrate the difficulty that a terrorist 
with a psychological disorder would have in joining a group (Sageman, 2004). 
The characteristics for which a probability as low as fifty percent can be rejected 
are traveling to an attack point and being born in the United States. Nine of ten lone 
wolves with a reported psychological disorder were born in  the United States. 
10. The Relationship Between Contact with another Extremist and Other 
Characteristics 
Only eight lone wolves had direct contact with at least one extremist prior to 
conducting an attack. The lone-wolf definition precludes any individual who plans an 
attack with anyone else from being a member of the studied population. The small 
population of lone wolves who have had contact with another extremist makes the 
binomial distribution analysis insignificant for many of the characteristics gathered for 
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the study. Suicide, previous membership in a group, and casualties incurred in an attack 
occurred infrequently enough to be below the minimum limit. The most significant result 
is that all eight of the lone-wolf terrorists who met with other extremists were born in the 
United States, which is above the maximum. 
11. The Relationship Between Casualties Occurring in an Attack and 
Other Characteristics 
The relative dearth of casualties and deaths directly caused by lone-wolf terrorism 
in the United States since 9/11 makes the binomial distribution analysis insignificant for 
most of the other characteristics studied. Many of the characteristics fall within the 
quantile range. Nine of the lone-wolf attacks with casualties occurred on a weekday and 
terrorists born in the United States perpetrated eight of these attacks. Both fall on the 
upper range limit. The most significant finding is that in the ten cases with casualties, 
only one involved a bomb and this case only injured one person, which is below the 
minimum limit. 
12. The Relationship Between the Use of a Firearm and Other 
Characteristics 
Weapon information was collected on all fifty-three cases of lone-wolf terrorism 
in the United States since 9/11. Seventeen of these terrorists used a firearm or planned to 
use a firearm in these attacks. Four of these cases also used an explosive device in 
conjunction with the gun. 
Assuming that a firearm is used, some of the other characteristics studied are 
within the quantile range of the binomial distribution analysis. Thus, it is fair to assume 
that this characteristic may have been about equally likely to occur during an attack with 
a gun as to not occur, which is the case with the likelihood of success. Eleven of the 
seventeen cases involving a firearm have been successful. Employment and marriage at 
the time of attack are also within the quantile range. In other words, the probability of a 
lone-wolf terrorist who used a gun within the population of the study may have been 
about even to have been employed or unemployed, married or single, and been successful 
or unsuccessful. Finally, firearm attacks producing casualties also fell in this range. 
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The characteristics for which it is likely that the probability of them occurring 
during a lone-wolf attack is below fifty percent are suicide, attacking a person of interest, 
psychological disorder, contact with extremists, and prior membership in a terrorist 
group. 
Only two characteristics have a total number of occurrences higher than the upper 
quantile limit. These characteristics are being born in the United States and traveling to 
the point of attack. 
13. The Relationship Between the Use of an Explosive Device (Bomb) and 
Other Characteristics 
Distinct differences occur between lone-wolf cases in which bombs were involved 
and in which firearms were involved. Thirty-two lone wolves used an explosive or 
planned to use an explosive in their attack, which accounts for fifty-four percent of every 
weapon used in the study population. Relatively few characteristics fell within the 
quantile range in which it is reasonable to assume that the probability of its occurrence is 
about fifty percent. The characteristics are employment and attacking a POI. Given that a 
lone wolf is attempting an attack with a bomb, it is reasonable to say that there is an equal 
chance of being employed or unemployed and is targeting a POI or the general public. 
Some characteristics appear relatively few times during an attack with an 
explosive device. These characteristics are success, suicide attack, marriage, 
psychological disorder, contact with extremists, previous membership in a terrorist group, 
and casualties incurred in the attack. Only nine of the thirty-two attacks involving a bomb 
were successful and only one of these attacks caused any casualties at all. The casualty 
was a minor injury caused by a pipe bomb. 
A few characteristics appear a relatively high number of times in the attacks 
involving an explosive device. Travel was just higher than the maximum limit in the 
quantile range. Therefore, the probability that a lone wolf using a bomb traveled to attack 
is likely higher than p=0.5 in the population. The numbers of times that a terrorist was 
born in the United States and the attack occurred on a weekday also are greater than the 
maximum limit.  
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D.  BINOMIAL AND QUANTITATIVE CHARACTERISTIC COMPARISON 
Both quantitative characteristics, such as age and number of casualties caused by 
attacks, and binomial characteristics, such as if the attack was successful or not, are 
analyzed in previous sections of this chapter. The following section compares the set of 
binomial characteristics to the set of quantitative characteristics to establish any 
quantitative differences that may occur if a binary characteristic is present or not, e.g., if a 
significant average age difference in successful attacks exists compared to unsuccessful 
attacks. 
Summary statistics have been calculated to describe and examine the set of data. 
These statistics are presented in the following tables. The summary statistics used for 
each data set are the minimum number, the first quartile, the mean average, the median 
average, the third quartile, the maximum number, and the standard deviation. The mean 
and median are measures of central tendency calculated to indicate the center of the 
population. The interquartile range is comprised of all data found between the first and 
third quartile. The first quartile is the point below which only twenty-five percent of the 
data are found. The third quartile is the point above which only twenty-five percent of 
data are found. Fifty percent of the data are found between the first and third quartiles. 
The standard deviation measures the spread of the distribution. Results that have been 
bolded and italicized in the tables are considered significant due to the large quantitative 
difference found between the “yes” and “no” conditions of the binary characteristic. 









Successful 15.0 years 26.0 40.7 41.0 51.0 88.0 17.3 
Unsuccessful 19.0 22.0 31.0 27.0 38.0 55.0 10.3 
Suicide 15.0 20.0 37.2 43.0 53.0 55.0 18.6 
No Suicide 19.0 23.0 35.2 34.0 45.0 88.0 14.3 
Travel 15.0 23.0 37.9 38.0 48.5 88.0 16.6 










Attacked POI 20.0 26.3 36.9 36.0 46.8 55.0 12.4 
Not Attack POI 15.0 22.0 34.5 29.5 40.25 88.0 16.0 
Born in U.S. 15.0 22.5 37.3 37.0 45.5 88.0 14.9 
Born Out of U.S. 19.0 19.5 23.1 21.0 24.5 34.0 5.5 
Weekday Attack  19.0 22.0 34.9 34.0 42.0 88.0 14.6 
Weekend Attack  15.0 26.5 38.3 45.0 48.5 58.0 15.7 
Psych. Disorder 15.0 20.5 33.6 32.5 45.5 55.0 14.4 
No Psych. 
Disorder 
19.0 22.0 36.0 34.0 45.0 88.0 16.0 
Contact w. 
Extremist 
20.0 22.8 32.0 32.0 37.5 51.0 10.5 
No Contact w. 
Extremist 
15.0 22.0 35.9 34.0 45.0 88.0 15.5 
Casualties 20.0 22.3 36.3 34.5 50.0 58.0 15.0 
No Casualties 15.0 24.3 35.2 34.5 45.0 88.0 14.7 
Firearm Used 21.0 26.0 40.7 39.0 50.0 88.0 17.1 
No Firearm Used 15.0 22.0 32.4 29.0 40.0 55.0 12.3 
Bomb Used 19.0 21.5 30.8 29.0 37.5 50.0 9.8 
No Bomb Used 15.0 26.0 42.0 43.0 54.0 88.0 17.9 
Internet Used 19.0 21.0 28.5 26.0 35.0 55.0 10.4 
Internet Not 
Used 
15.0 26.8 39.5 39.0 50.0 88.0 15.6 
Table 4.5. Comparison of Lone Wolves’ Age (Years) to Binary Characteristics 
Popular terrorist myth, as described in the literature review, is that terrorists are 
young and uneducated. Contrary to this profile, there is a wide range of ages of lone-wolf 
terrorists in the United States The youngest lone offender is fifteen-year-old Charles 
Bishop and the oldest lone wolf is eighty-eight-year-old James Von Brunn. The mean 
average age for the population is 35.44 years old. 
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In some instances, a correlation may occur between age and binary 
characteristics. The median age of successful lone-wolf attackers is forty-one years. This 
age is much older than the median age of unsuccessful ones, which is only twenty-seven 
years. The older population of this study has generally had more success than the younger 
population. A marked difference exists in traveling to attack as well. The median age of 
the lone-wolf population that ventures out from their resident city is thirty-eight years. In 
comparison, the median age of lone wolves who attack in their hometown is twenty-six 
years. The median age of the population who was born in the United States is thirty-seven 
years old. The median age of those born in a foreign country is twenty-one years old, 
which is a large and consistent discrepancy. The oldest lone wolf to be born outside of 
the United States was only thirty-four years old and the standard deviation for this 
population is a picayune 5.5 years. 
Additional differences in the method of planning and weaponry used in lone-wolf 
attacks occurred. A ten-year age discrepancy exists between lone actors who chose a 
firearm and those that chose an explosive device. The median age for firearm use is 
thirty-nine years old while the median for no firearm in the attack is twenty-nine years. 
The dataset on bombs is the opposite. The median age for incorporating an explosive 
device in an attack is twenty-nine years while the median age for not using a bomb is 
forty-three years. 
The use of the Internet is an emerging trend in lone-wolf terrorism. The number 
and percentage of total cases that have actively used the Internet has increased since 
2008. Data suggest a difference in the age of the population of lone wolves who use the 
Internet and those that do not. The median age of the population that used the Internet is 














Successful 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.0 1.0 13.0 2.7 
Unsuccessful 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Suicide 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 2.0 0.8 
No Suicide 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 13.0 2.1 
Travel 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.0 3.0 0.8 
Did Not Travel 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 1.0 13.0 3.7 
Attacked POI 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 5.0 1.1 
Not Attack POI 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 1.0 13.0 2.5 
Born in U.S. 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 1.0 13.0 2.4 
Born Out of U.S. 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.9 
Weekday Attack  0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 13.0 2.1 
Weekend Attack  0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 1.0 2.0 0.8 
Psych. Disorder 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.0 1.8 5.0 1.6 
No Psych. 
Disorder 
0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 13.0 2.4 
Contact w. 
Extremist 
0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 1.0 13.0 4.5 
No Contact w. 
Extremist 
0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.0 5.0 1.1 
Firearm Used 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 13.0 3.1 
No Firearm Used 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.8 
Bomb Used 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Internet Used 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 13.0 3.2 
Internet Not 
Used 
0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 1.0 5.0 1.2 
Table 4.6. Comparison of Number of Deaths Caused in Lone-wolf Attacks to Binary 
Characteristics 
Table 4.6 visually emphasizes the fact that relatively few deaths have been caused 
by lone-wolf terrorists in the United States in the past decade. The mean average number 
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of deaths per case is only 0.64. Only three of the fifty-three attacks have produced more 
than two deaths. The limited number of deaths makes it difficult to glean meaningful 
associations. The most significant comparison is between the use of explosive devices 
and firearms. The mean average number of deaths caused by a lone-wolf attack involving 
a firearm is 1.5, which is not a prodigious figure; although; it is significant compared to 
explosive devices. Since 9/11, no lone-wolf attack incorporating a bomb has directly 
caused a single death. 









Successful 0.0 miles 0.0 77.1 20.0 37.5 811.0 188.0 
Unsuccessful 0.0 0.0 75.1 15.0 80.0 430.0 135.9 
Suicide 0.0 7.5 15.5 17.5 25.5 27.0 12.8 
No Suicide 0.0 0.0 75.1 15.0 80.0 430.0 135.9 
Attacked POI 0.0 2.5 94.2 28.5 117.5 430.0 148.7 
Not Attack POI 0.0 0.0 64.6 12.5 41.3 811.0 174.1 
Born in U.S. 0.0 0.0 67.1 20.0 50.0 430.0 119.3 
Born Out of U.S. 0.0 0.0 110.
7 
20.0 45.0 811.0 263.4 
Psych. Disorder 0.0 12.5 43.7 27.0 37.0 180.0 62.2 
No Psych. 
Disorder 
0.0 0.0 95.4 10.0 80.0 811.0 195.5 
Contact w. 
Extremist 
0.0 0.0 38.3 0.0 37.5 180.0 72.2 
No Contact w. 
Extremist 
0.0 0.0 87.6 17.5 57.5 811.0 181.4 
Casualties 0.0 0.0 10.4 0.0 10.0 45.0 16.1 
No Casualties 0.0 0.0 98.0 27.0 80.0 811.0 183.7 
Firearm Used 0.0 0.0 87.1 22.0 57.5 811.0 200.2 
No Firearm Used 0.0 0.0 67.4 15.0 35.0 430.0 131.1 
Bomb Used 0.0 0.0 77.3 21.0 72.5 430.0 136.2 










Internet Used 0.0 0.0 56.9 3.0 50.0 430.0 119.8 
Internet Not 
Used 
0.0 0.0 87.0 25.0 47.5 811.0 184.9 
Table 4.7. Comparison of the Distance Traveled by Lone Wolves to Attack (Miles) 
to Binary Characteristics 
A wide range occurs in the distance that the lone-wolf population traveled to 
conduct their crimes. Many members of the population did not leave their hometowns or 
cities. Conversely, at least six of the fifty-three lone wolves journeyed further than one 
hundred miles from their residence. The expansive range, variance, and standard 
deviation hinder the direct comparison of some characteristics. Still, a few areas related 
to travel stand out. Although only five cases of attempted suicide have occurred, none of 
these lone wolves traveled further than twenty-seven miles. The number of miles traveled 
differs in attacks that caused casualties versus those in which no one was injured. In 
attacks with casualties, the mean average distance traveled is 10.4 miles. The maximum 
distance traveled is only forty-five miles. In contrast, the mean distance traveled is 
ninety-eight miles for attacks that did not produce casualties. 
E.  RESULTS 
A comprehensive analysis of the characteristics of lone wolves and their attacks is 
necessary to build a foundation of core knowledge on the subject, which is accomplished 
in this thesis by using univariate analysis, bivariate analysis, binomial distribution 
analysis, and quantitative characteristic comparison. These analyses illuminate themes in 
lone-wolf terrorism that are listed in Table 4.8. The themes are characteristics often, or 









Characteristic Often Associated with… Rarely Associated with… 
Male Attacks  
Weekday  Attacks  
Born in the United States Attacks; Success  
Travel Attacks; Success; Casualties; Deaths 
Explosive Devices Attacks; Attacking POIs; Born in 
the United States 
Success; Deaths; Casualties; 
Marriage; Suicide 
Firearms Born in the United States; 
Attacking the General Public 
Attacking POIs; Suicide 
Older Age Travel; Born in the United States; 
Firearm; Success 
Bomb; Internet 
Younger Age No Travel; Born Outside of the 
United States; Bomb; Internet 
 
Suicide  Attacks 
Previously in Terrorist Group  Attacks 
Contact with Extremists  Attacks 
Table 4.8. Themes of Lone-wolf Attacks in the United States Since 9/11 
Some of the themes of lone-wolf terrorism found by statistical analysis do not 
conform to previous notions of terrorism. Many of these notions and profiles are 
discussed in the literature review section of this study. Single case studies and inferential 
dispositional analyses may have led some policymakers, members of the homeland 
security community, and the public to form a visual profile of the lone-wolf terrorist in 
the United States. However, lone wolves have had many different dispositions, 
characteristics, and ideologies. The only characteristic undoubtedly present in every case 
is that the attacker is a terrorist who plans an attack against an adversary alone and 
attempts to conduct the plan alone. 
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V.  DISCUSSION 
A.  RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Synthesizing the statistical analysis presented in this study with the existing 
literature on lone-wolf terrorism formulates a foundation for knowledge and preventive 
policy regarding lone-wolf terrorists in the United States since September 2001. Due to 
their isolated nature, these extremists present unique problems to the homeland security 
community and law enforcement. It will be difficult to identify and apprehend every 
future lone-wolf terrorist; however, strategies may be able to be developed to reduce the 
number of cases or their effects. A historical, comprehensive understanding of lone-wolf 
characteristics, attacks, factors that lead to successful attacks, motivations, and goals is 
necessary to frame the threat of lone-wolf terrorism in the United States. Effective policy 
and strategies to reduce the number of successful attacks and minimize the impact of 
lone-wolf terrorism can be properly developed once this decrease has been accomplished. 
1. Research Question 1: What Are the Characteristics of Lone Wolves, 
Their Plans, and Their Attacks 
No single profile describes the U.S. lone-wolf terrorist. Few of the fifty-three 
cases had overwhelming similarities across multiple characteristics. The results of the 
analysis show that some popular stereotypes of lone actors are not correct. Lone-wolf 
terrorists are not necessarily lower-class residents with no prospect of social mobility. In 
fact, they are about as likely to be employed as unemployed. Sixteen of the twenty-seven 
cases for which educational background is known had attended college prior to 
committing their attack. Additionally, no clear majority of cases exhibits any 
psychological disorder. The small population of lone wolves disallows a statistically 
significant comparison of behavioral health between these specific terrorists and the 
general population; however, no characteristics within this study occurred for which 
psychological disorder is co-associated higher than fifty percent (p=0.5). 
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No comprehensive portfolio of precise characteristics can be used to establish a 
single profile of a lone-wolf terrorist. Although a profile does not exist, certain 
characteristics and relationships amongst characteristics are indicative of lone-wolf 
terrorists. The population in this study is entirely male. A female lone-wolf terrorist has 
not appeared in the United States in the past decade. A higher proportion of men belong 
to terrorist groups, as well; although, it is striking that no single female perpetrator exists 
at this time. It is likely one will appear in the future; however, this study has shown that 
no exact, constant disposition of a lone wolf exists.  
It is interesting that a high percentage of the cases occurred on a weekday as 
opposed to a weekend. Only seven of the fifty-three lone wolves attacked or were 
apprehended on a Saturday or Sunday. Lone wolves targeting the general public may 
have chosen a weekday to increase the number of casualties and attention to their attack. 
Some initial research on user-supplied feeds on the social media website Twitter shows 
that users write angrier language on weekdays, especially Thursday (Ahn, Lehmann, 
Mislove, Onnela, & Rosenquist, 2010). Only one successful case has targeted the general 
public on a weekend. Jim Adkisson specifically attacked the congregation of a church 
near his house during Sunday service when he knew that his target would be filled with 
the most people possible. 
The majority of lone wolves who have targeted American people, buildings, and 
infrastructure were born in the United States, which is logical because the attacks in this 
study all transpired on U.S. soil. Certain cultural aspects of U.S. society might also 
predicate an extremist to become a lone wolf. The United States is a society that tends to 
emphasize individualism and personal disposition (Triandis, 1994). This societal 
characteristic, coupled with potential advantages of being U.S.-born, such as having a 
higher level of understanding of U.S. culture, may lead to a disproportionally high 
number of lone-wolf attacks in the United States perpetrated by U.S.-born lone wolves. 
Lone-wolf tactics vary based on the attacker’s skill level, ideology, and goals. 
Lone wolves have used many different attack styles. These attackers have used firearms 
on U.S. citizens, planted bombs, and chosen their automobile as a weapon of choice. The 
most popular weapon for lone-wolf style attacks in this study is an explosive device. A 
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bomb has been chosen more than every other weapon combined and twice as often as a 
firearm. This finding is in contrast to Ramon Spaiij’s study (2012) on lone-wolf 
terrorism. He finds that lone wolves worldwide use firearms at a higher rate than 
explosives. Lone wolves within the United States within his population used a gun 
seventy-percent of the time (Spaiij, 2012). This study analyzes attacks from 1968–2010. 
The two studies combined may show that the preferred weapon of lone wolves may be 
evolving over time. 
Lone wolves may be choosing bombs due to the amount of overt, excessive 
violence that a successful explosive causes. At least one article in Inspire magazine has 
focused on bomb building technique. A longer planning process may be necessary in 
plots involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The individuals who choose this 
method must acquire the materials and build the bomb. Although lone wolves who use 
firearms may or may not have planned ahead for their attacks, significant premeditation is 
a necessary component of a lone-wolf attack involving an explosive device.  
Another interesting aspect of lone-wolf terrorism is travel. Twenty-seven of forty 
lone wolves whose residencies are known traveled to commence their attack. Only one of 
these twenty-seven traveled less than ten miles from their residence and nearly all 
traveled more than twenty-five miles, which makes sense for any terrorist who wishes to 
attack a specific target, building, person, or large public gathering not in the immediate 
vicinity of the lone wolf’s residence. The time and distance that a lone wolf travels may 
be an area in which an intervention by law enforcement can occur. Unexpected travel by 
a suspect could indicate operational terrorist activity. The number of lone wolves who 
have traveled over twenty-five miles to commit an attack is significant because law 
enforcement agencies across multiple jurisdictions may be involved in intervening. 
Future policy for law enforcement will need to be formed to ensure that proper 
collaboration and information sharing exists between these partner agencies. 
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2. Research Question 2: What Are Factors and Characteristics That Are 
Related to Success and Failure? 
Both travel and explosive devices are seen in a majority of cases of lone-wolf 
terrorism; however, the analysis shows that neither of these attack characteristics has a 
strong positive relationship with success. More attacks have been successful when the 
lone wolf does not travel from his resident city or town. The analysis in this study 
demonstrates that a high number of deaths caused in a lone-wolf attack is not associated 
with travel. Many confounding variables may add to this effect. For example, terrorists 
who travel might be more likely to have elaborate plans that are difficult to complete. 
Mobile lone wolves might also be more likely to use an explosive device, which is rarely 
seen in successful attacks. In fact, there has not been a single death caused by a lone wolf 
using a bomb in the United States since 9/11. Many lone wolves have attempted to buy 
material and create bombs; however, few have successfully conducted an attack with one. 
Lone-wolf attacks are successful nearly half the time. Twenty-five of the fifty-
three attacks in this study met the perpetrator’s main objective.3 In some cases, this 
objective is to kill people to prove a point, but there are also individuals who used 
terrorist tactics to destroy symbolic buildings or promote political and personal views. 
These cases can also be considered successful. 
There are some characteristics that have a positive relationship with successful 
lone-wolf attacks. The first characteristic is being born in the U.S. Although more than 
half of all lone-wolf terrorists within the population were born domestically in the United 
States, sixty-eight percent of all successful attacks came from U.S.-born terrorists. These 
lone wolves caused eleven of the twelve attacks that incurred deaths. The only foreign-
born lone wolf in the study who successfully killed U.S. residents, Hesham Mohamed 
Hadayet, had lived in the country for at least a decade. This study suggests that older age 
is the second characteristic that has a positive relationship with successful attacks. The 
median average age of an attacker is forty-one years in a successful attack while the 
average age for an unsuccessful attack is twenty-seven years. This difference in age may 
                                                 
3 In cases in which the lone-wolf terrorist did not explicitly cite his main objective, the objective was 
inferred by the researcher. 
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be due to the lone wolf’s patience or experience, and also possibly due to weapon choice 
and other attack characteristics. The mean average age of lone wolves who used only a 
firearm is 44.0 years old; whereas, the average age for those who used a bomb is only 
30.6. Casualties and deaths are rare in lone-wolf attacks. These outcomes are especially 
rare in attacks involving explosive devices, which is interesting because more training 
and planning may be necessary to use a bomb effectively compared to a firearm. 
3. Research Question 3: What Are the Incentives and Motivations for an 
Extremist to Choose the Lone-wolf Tactic? 
Right-wing nationalist Louis Beam (1992) first promoted the lone-wolf tactic to 
avoid the pitfalls of a hierarchal terrorist organization that government authorities could 
easily disrupt. Extreme Islamists have adopted the strategy in recent publications 
including Inspire magazine. Promoting the lone-wolf tactic is valuable to group terrorists 
because lone wolves share some ideological similarities. The lone wolf is a pre-deployed, 
culturally immersed soldier with few, if any, ties to the terrorist organization. 
This study demonstrates that personal motivations may cause the lone wolf to use 
the tactic. Although propaganda is useful for potential terrorists, charismatic terrorist 
group leaders may not be the main catalyst for lone-wolf terrorism. Furthermore, lone 
wolves are not strictly acting on behalf of terrorist groups. The culture of individualism in 
the United States coupled with situational and contextual factors increase the occurrence 
of lone-wolf terrorism in America. Lone wolves combine their personal ideologies, 
history, and grievances with established group ideologies. Each actor essentially creates a 
separate terrorist group comprised of one individual. The data in this study support this 
claim. The lone-wolf population has had little contact with fellow extremists prior to 
conducting an attack. Only eighteen percent of the population in the study had previous 
contact with extremists. A sect of lone wolves attempted to meet with outside extremists 
just prior to operationalizing an attack; however, nearly all of these cases involve lone 
wolves who had already established objectives and plans to attack. Only seven percent of 
the studied lone wolves had ever been a member of a terrorist group. This study 
demonstrates that the majority of lone wolves in the United States since 9/11 have 
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radicalized alone while formulating personal goals. These goals may align with group 
terrorist goals; however, the lone-wolf terrorist is not a direct agent of the group. 
Suicide is an interesting characteristic that has rarely accompanied attacks. Lone 
wolves in the United States may be opting for individual, long-term campaigns. Lone 
wolves have planned or attempted only five suicide attacks. This low number is in direct 
contrast to trends in group terrorism that show the suicide tactic as increasing in 
popularity throughout the world (Brannan et al., 2004). Only one Muslim extremist has 
successfully completed a suicide attack, fifteen-year-old Charles Bishop who flew a small 
plane into a building causing no additional casualties in 2002.  
4. Research Question 4: Are Lone-wolf Attacks Random, Isolated 
Events? 
Lone-wolf attacks in the United States in the past decade appear to occur at 
frequent, random intervals. No clear pattern in the time of year of the attacks and amount 
of time between attacks occurring is noticed. An important statistic is that lone-wolf 
attempts (including arrests) have been more likely to occur on a weekday than a 
weekend. Eighty-seven percent of the attempts studied occurred on a weekday, which 
exceeds the seventy-one percent, or five out of the week’s seven days that are Monday 
through Friday. This result could be purposeful. Lone wolves may be specifically 
targeting attacks for weekdays to raise awareness of the attack due to increased media 
exposure. Additionally, attacks on the general public might be planned for weekdays 
because the perpetrator believes it will increase the number of casualties, disrupt society, 
and ensure that people are in predictable locations. 
As a general trend, the number of lone-wolf attacks per year is increasing. The 
average number of attacks per year from 2009–2011 is higher than any other three-year 






















* 2001 includes date from September 12, 2001 through December 31, 2001 
N=53 
Figure 5.1. Number of Lone-wolf Attacks in the United States by Year 
A number of factors may be contributing to the increase in attacks over time. One 
characteristic that has been increasing at a similar rate is the use of the Internet. More 
than three times as many lone wolves are known to have radicalized online or propagated 
their views on the Internet from 2009–2011 (N=13) than in all other years combined 
(N=4). The data in this study suggest that lone wolves radicalize alone in many cases. 
Internet websites and propaganda are some of the few conduits for radicalization without 
direct contact with other extremists. Online campaigns by right-wing radicals and 
Islamists groups, such as al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), effectively target 
individuals who may turn to lone-wolf terrorism. Anwar al-Awlaki had directed the 
AQAP online campaign. It will be interesting to see how the AQAP online campaign 
continues after his death on September 30, 2011 and if it affects the number of attacks by 
Islamist extremists in the United States in future years. 
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5. Research Question 5: What Policies and Recommendations Can Be 
Instituted to Reduce the Number of Lone-wolf Attacks and Their 
Effects? 
The diverse population of lone wolves who have planned and conducted attacks in 
the United States does not allow for a strict profile of these attackers. The examination of 
dispositional factors, such as age, race, and religion, will not be an effective method for 
detecting these extremists. This study demonstrates that lone wolves take some actions in 
a high percentage of cases. These actions and contexts can be highlighted as potential 
intervention points for law enforcement. Intervention can be best accomplished as law 
enforcement builds intelligence on a suspected case of lone-wolf terrorism. As 
intelligence gathering occurs, it might be beneficial to release information to the public. 
Publishing information on specific threats, groups, or individuals (including unknown 
individuals who have completed an attack) could apply pressure on lone-wolf terrorists 
and force them to make a mistake or alter plans (Spaaij, 2012). 
The three actions that have been taken by a high percentage of lone wolves are 
using an explosive device, traveling to attack, and attacking on a weekday. Table 5.1 
indicates examples of policies and procedures that could be implemented to reduce 
attacks. 
 
Associated Action of Lone 
Wolf 
Preventive Policy / Procedure Objective 
Highway toll operators trained to be 
front-line of “See Something, Say 
Something” campaign 
 
Toll operators able to spot 
suspicious behaviors or indicators 
of terrorists that are traveling 
 
Use of automatic license plate readers 
on highway systems to flag suspected 
lone wolves’ travel 
 
Raise awareness of suspects 
traveling to law enforcement 
 
Closely monitor any travel of 
suspected terrorists 
 
Disrupt attack during travel stage 
 
Travel to Attack 
Train law enforcement officers to 
recognize atypical behavior during 
routine traffic stops 
Police officers able to spot 
suspicious behaviors or indicators 
of terrorists that are traveling 
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Associated Action of Lone 
Wolf 
Preventive Policy / Procedure Objective 
Distribute list of bomb “ingredients” 
as published by terrorist propaganda 
to retailers that carry these 
components 
 
Retail locations able to notice 
suspicious purchases  
 
Using Explosive Device 
Monitor IP addresses of Internet 
users who view websites that contain 
information on building explosive 
devices 
Build intelligence on individuals 
who view websites with 
information on bomb building. 
These individuals may be more 
likely to create an explosive device. 
Closely monitor absences from work 
for any individuals that have been 
identified as terrorist suspects 
 
Disrupt attack and account for 
unplanned absences 
 
Attack on a Weekday 
Increase protection of events or high-
value targets on weekdays 
Enhance security and increase 
likelihood of disrupting an attack 
Table 5.1. Examples of Preventive Policies and Procedures to Reduce Occurrences of 
Lone-wolf Terrorism 
This study demonstrates characteristics and actions that have occurred in the past. 
The data and results do not guarantee that future attacks will follow these patterns. 
Additionally, the variance in the dispositional characteristics of lone wolves makes it 
difficult to formulate a method to detect these terrorists amongst the general population. 
A more effective method may be to address overarching issues in communities at-risk for 
terrorism by influencing factors surrounding residents at risk of radicalization. LaFree 
and Bersani (2012) demonstrate that ethnic diversity in neighborhoods may result in 
isolation, alienation, and feelings of marginalization from the larger host community and 
that these conditions are significantly associated with areas where terrorists attack. Host 
communities, and their government agencies should make an effort to demarginalize the 
marginalized. This effort can be accomplished by incorporating minority populations, 
including residents who have minority political views, in the host community and its 
organizations. Ensuring opportunity may temper extremism. Governments and 
communities do not need to promote radical views, but they may need to acknowledge 
their existence publicly. 
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Phillip Bobbitt (2008) writes that a community is in either a state of terror or state 
of consent, that these forces are constantly pulling each other, and that those residents 
with minority views are in a state of terror. This study on lone wolves demonstrates that 
these actors have individualized, marginalized views. Further, it has been shown the lone 
wolves radicalize alone, rarely fit in with terrorist groups, and feel isolated from the 
community. These individuals are left open to violent extremism. Bobbitt (2008) suggests 
that a state of consent can overcome a state of terror by precluding the conditions of 
terror. Along these lines, a society that grants individuals with minority political views 
the freedom to express these views in a non-violent manner will be a community of 
consent. Conversely, the state of terror prevails when the host community’s fear of 
minority views is so high that it alleviates that community’s discomfort with allowing 
policy that decreases freedom and opportunity for both majority and minority views. 
B.  LIMITATIONS 
The purpose of this study is to examine the characteristics of lone-wolf terrorism 
in the United States since 9/11. A broad spectrum of data has been collected and 
analyzed. The analysis has led to results that can be considered a basis of knowledge on 
this population. Unfortunately, the wide spectrum of characteristics precluded the study 
from having a narrow focus on any single characteristic or relationship between 
characteristics. 
The data were collected using open-source, unclassified information from a 
variety of sources including mainstream media, published reports, and existing databases. 
It was not possible to collect every data point for every characteristic across every case of 
lone-wolf terrorism. 
A specific definition for lone-wolf terrorism has been used in this study to best 
define the population. Cases may arise that meet some, most, or even all of the criteria in 
the definition that have not been included in this study. Additionally, numerous cases of 
lone-wolf terrorism outside of the United States and cases within the United States before 
9/11 were not analyzed as part of this study. 
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The population of the study (N=53) is relatively small. In some instances, 
insufficient data existed for a particular characteristic to run a certain statistical test. 
Characteristics for which little or no data are available were not included in the analysis. 
C.  OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Lone-wolf terrorism is a narrow subject; however, the attributes examined in this 
study encompass a wide and diverse range of information on this phenomenon. The 
analysis of this information has developed a basis of knowledge on the subject, but areas 
for further research have also been uncovered. Some of the significant findings in this 
study warrant additional consideration and focus in separate studies. These findings 
include the low number of suicide attacks, the high number of attacks on weekdays, the 
older age of successful lone wolves, the limited amount of exposure lone wolves have 
had with extremists and extremist groups, and the high percentage of terrorists who chose 
to attack using an explosive device. 
The information on lone wolves gleaned from this study needs to be compared to 
at least two other populations. First, an examination between these terrorists and their 
counterparts in other foreign countries worldwide should be conducted. The comparison 
between the two populations could yield results that might elicit different tactics for 
curbing lone-wolf terrorism in different countries. Second, the juxtaposition between the 
characteristics of lone-wolf terrorism and members of terrorist groups should be studied. 
Numerous studies on groups in the past have yielded policies to reduce terrorism. The 
direct comparison between lone-wolf and group terrorists will show which policies that 
have been developed for group terrorists might be either successful or unsuccessful in 
abating lone-wolf terrorism. 
Finally, this study is an overview and analysis of lone-wolf terrorism that has 
occurred in the United States from 2001 to 2011. Similar studies will need to be 
completed periodically to validate the conclusions expressed in this study and capture 
emerging trends in lone-wolf terrorism.  
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D.  CONCLUSIONS 
The study of lone-wolf terrorism in the United States since September 2011 
demonstrates that few static characteristics are common to this population. A wide range 
and many differences in characteristics occur, such as age, race, ideology, and religion. 
The most often associated personal attributes are male gender and being born in the 
United States. These findings are logical and existing literature on terrorism affirms the 
dominance of males in terrorist groups. These findings are notable; however, they do not 
narrow down the population of potential lone wolves within the general population. 
Personal context, environmental factors, and external stimuli may be better indicators of 
lone-wolf attacks. To best understand and recognize these factors, community 
involvement and outreach are vital, which should include community oriented policing 
practices. It will also be essential to increase the role that minority populations, including 
those who harbor minority political views, have in community organizations, 
government, and the political process. The high percentage of lone wolves who have had 
little or no contact with terrorist groups indicates that a distinct and discrete law 
enforcement strategy is necessary for these terrorists. Current strategies for countering 
terrorist groups may not be effective for reducing lone-wolf attacks. 
The other opportunity for intervention is during common steps associated with 
lone-wolf attacks. Some actions have been conducted by a high percentage of these 
offenders. Policies need to be developed to intervene during common practices, such as 
traveling to the point of attack, attacking on a weekday, using the Internet to radicalize, 
and building and using an explosive device in an attack. 
Lone-wolf terrorism is complex—each individual actor has multiple personal 
contexts and motivations. An individual lone wolf defines his goals based on a mixture of 
personal grievances, self-interest, and established ideology. The individual terrorist 
effectively constitutes his own, solo terrorist group. Conversely, terrorist group 
organizations have defined, overarching goals. A group member may have many 
contexts, but, while conducting group activity, the terrorist largely follows the 
organization’s established ideals. The data from this study show that most lone wolves 
have never been members of terrorist groups and have had little or no contact with 
 73
extremists. This study demonstrates that many lone wolves not only plan and operate 
alone, but that they also radicalize alone or indirectly with other extremists. The 
radicalization process begins when the extremist feels that either peers or the community 
at large marginalizes his views. 
The direct, overt consequences of lone-wolf terrorism have been minimal in the 
United States. Only thirty-four deaths and ninety-five casualties were caused by the 
phenomenon in the decade since 9/11. On the other hand, the threat of lone-wolf 
terrorism is relatively high. At least fifty-three attacks and attempts have occurred during 
this time period. Undoubtedly, additional lone-wolf attacks on American soil will occur 
in the future. To reduce the threat level, U.S. policy to curb lone offender extremism will 
need to be developed based on the analysis of past attacks. These policies should increase 
engagement between the community and government and reduce the minimization of 
minority views.  
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APPENDIX. SUMMARY OF LONE-WOLF CASES IN THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA SINCE 9/11 
1. September 2001—Bruce Ivens 
A series of packages containing a white powder were sent to various locations in 
New York, the District of Columbia, and Florida soon after the events of September 11, 
2001. These packages contained bacillus anthracis, commonly known as anthrax. The 
bioterrorism attacks killed five people and caused seventeen additional casualties. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officially closed the case in 2010 and cited that Dr. 
Bruce Ivens acted alone in these attacks. 
2. January 2002—Charles Bishop 
Fifteen-year-old Charles Bishop intentionally crashed a Cessna airplane into a 
Tampa office building. Bishop acted alone and committed suicide in the attack. No 
additional casualties occurred. A note retrieved from the plane wreckage indicated that 
Bishop sympathized with al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.  
3. April-May 2002—Lucas John Helder  
Lucas John Helder was indicted by a grand jury for planting eighteen pipe bombs 
in five states over a five-day period. Six of the bombs exploded and injured six total 
people. Helder had penned a politically fueled manifesto prior to commencing the 
attacks.  
4. July 2002—Hesham Mohamed Hadayet  
Hesham Mohamed Hadayet opened fire in Los Angeles International Airport on 
July 4, 2002 near the ticket counter for Israel’s El Al Airlines. Three people were killed 
and four others were injured by the attacks. Authorities shot and killed Hadayet at the 
scene.  
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5. October 2002—Steve Kim  
Postal worker Steve Kim fired seven shots at the United Nations to physically 
protest North Korea’s treatment of its citizens.  
6. March 2003—Dwight Watson  
Dwight Watson drove a tractor into a pond near the National Mall in the District 
of Columbia on March 17, 2003 and made bomb threats. No functional explosive device 
was found on Watson on March 19 when he was apprehended. The act of terrorism was 
due to Watson’s views on current policies affecting farmers in America.  
7. March 2003—Eid Elwirelwir  
Eid Elwirelwir, a United States citizen born in Venezuela, intentionally rammed 
his vehicle into March Air Reserve Base in California in order to protest America’s 
involvement in the Middle East. Elwirelwir also sympathized with Saddam Hussein and 
indicated that he was oppressed as a Muslim living in America. 
8. October-November 2003—Unknown (“Fallen Angel”)  
Two letters containing the bioterrorism agent ricin were found in October and 
November 2003. Both were authored under the pseudonym “Fallen Angel” and expressed 
concerns over truck driver regulations. One letter was addressed to the Department of 
Transportation and a second was addressed to the White House. There were no casualties 
in this attack.  
9. November 2003—Stephen John Jordi  
The FBI arrested Stephen John Jordi on November 11, 2003 after purchasing the 
components of an explosive device. Jordi planned to detonate the bombs on site at 
numerous abortion clinics. He was apprehended after discussing the plan with an FBI 
informant.  
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10. February 2004—Unknown  
A suspicious letter that tested positive for ricin was received at the office of 
Senator Bill Frist. There were no casualties caused by the toxin. Although this case is 
similar to the “Fallen Angel” letters in late 2003, authorities have not found any link in 
the cases.  
11. October 2004—Demetrius Van Crocker  
Demetrius Van Crocker attempted to purchase C-4 plastic explosives and sarin 
nerve agent from an arms dealer in October 2004. Van Crocker plotted to blow up a 
government courthouse before an undercover agent caught him.  
12. October 2004—Ivan Braden  
The FBI Ivan Braden arrested for plotting to bomb Lenoir City’s National Guard 
Armory and a Jewish synagogue in the area. Braden had multiple guns and explosive 
devices and held racist beliefs. He was recently discharged from the National Guard due 
to his erratic behavior. 
13. May 2005—Unknown  
Two small explosions occurred outside of a building housing the British 
Consulate in New York City on May 5, 2005. The blasts took place during Great 
Britain’s polling for the general election. No one was injured in the explosions. Security 
camera footage showed a lone bicyclist fleeing the scene directly before the blasts.  
14. September 2005—Mahmoud Maawad  
Mahmoud Maawad was living in the United States illegally for six years prior to 
his arrest in September 2005. Maawad had purchased pilot gear, instructional videos, and 
flight books over the Internet and had plotted to use an airplane as a weapon. Maawad 
was reported to the FBI by a pilot shop after he attempted to buy $3,300 worth of pilot 
gear.  
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15. December 2005—Michael Curtis Reynolds  
Michael Curtis Reynolds was arrested, and later convicted, of attempting to 
provide material support to al Qaeda. Reynolds plotted to blow up oil pipelines and 
refineries.  
16. March 2006—Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar  
A University of North Carolina (UNC) graduate was charged with nine counts of 
attempted murder after driving an automobile through a crowd of people on campus at 
UNC. The twenty-two year old Iran native told investigators that he wanted to “avenge 
the deaths or murders of Muslims around the world.” The attack produced nine casualties 
with minor injuries. 
17. June 2006—Robert Weiler  
Robert Weiler was sentenced to five years in prison for possessing a pipe bomb 
and a firearm and attempting to destroy an abortion clinic. Weiler had planned to shoot 
doctors who provided abortions and bomb a clinic in Greenbelt, Maryland.  
18. July 2006—Naveed Afzkal Haq  
Naveed Afzkal Haq opened fire with a handgun at the offices of the Jewish 
Federation of Greater Seattle. The Muslim man acted alone and chose to attack due to his 
negative sentiments towards Israel. Haq killed one woman and wounded five others.  
19. September 2006—David Robert McMenemy  
David Robert McMenemy attempted to burn down a women’s health clinic that 
he believed was an abortion clinic. McMenemy filled a bottle with gasoline and tried to 
explode the bottle in the lobby of the clinic; however, the building’s sprinkler systems 
mitigated the flame. 
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20. December 2006—Derrick Shareef  
Derrick Shareef was arrested as he attempted to purchase grenades and a handgun 
from an undercover FBI agent. Shareef planned to attack government buildings and an 
area shopping center.  
21. March 2007—Andrew Spencer  
A Rikers Island, New York prison inmate attempted to orchestrate a plot to hire a 
hitman to kill New York City police commissioner Raymond Kelly and bomb police 
headquarters. This plot has been linked indirectly as retaliation for the Sean Bell shooting 
in New York City. 
22. April 2007—Paul Ross Evans  
Paul Ross Evans attempted to detonate a bomb outside of the Austin Women’s 
Health Center. The bomb did not detonate because the triggering wire did not make 
contact with any explosive material. Law enforcement found the bomb after receiving a 
call regarding a suspicious package outside of the center.  
23. September 2007—Houssein Zorkot  
Houssein Zorkot was arrested in Hemlock Park in Detroit, Michigan wearing 
camouflage and carrying an AK-47 assault rifle. Zorkot sympathized with the terrorist 
group Hizballah and maintained a website with terrorist messages and ideals.  
24. October 2007—Unknown  
Two hand grenades that had been fashioned into pipe bombs were thrown outside 
the Mexican Consulate in New York City on October 26, 2007. This attack was similar to 
the March 5, 2005 attack on the British Consulate. The blast destroyed windows on the 
building, but did not cause any casualties.  
25. March 2008—Unknown  
An armed forces recruiting station in Times Square in New York City was hit 
with an improvised explosive on March 6, 2008. The blast was similar to the October 
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2007 attack on the Mexican Consulate and the March 2005 attack on the British 
Consulate. Security cameras had footage of a lone bicyclist fleeing the scene just prior to 
the attack.  
26. January 2008—Michael S. Gorbey  
Explosives were found in the impounded truck of Michael Gorbey after he was 
arrested on Capitol Hill for carrying a loaded shotgun. He was indicted for attempting to 
detonate a weapon of mass destruction by the federal government.  
27. July 2008—Jim Adkisson  
Jim Adkisson opened fire at a Unitarian church in Tennessee. He was motivated 
to attack because of the church’s liberal policies. Adkisson killed two people and 
wounded seven other when he attacked during church service.  
28. August 2008—Timothy Johnson  
Timothy Johnson fatally shot Arkansas State Democratic Party Chairman Bill 
Gwatney on August 13, 2008. No clear motive was uncovered and it is not known that 
the two men had any previous contact.  
29. January 2009—Roderick Robinson  
Roderick Robinson made a bomb threat at a federal building in Oklahoma City 
that he believed housed the Social Security Administration. Robinson went inside the 
building and handed a note to a security guard that indicated that there was a bomb in his 
backpack and outside of the building.  
30. January 2009—Keith Luke  
Keith Luke shot and killed two people and seriously wounded one additional 
person in a rampage fueled by racism against “non-whites.” Luke attacked two sisters and 
a homeless man and attempted to go to a Jewish synagogue to shoot members as they 
left.  
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31. May 2009—Scott Roeder  
Scott Roeder shot and killed Dr. George Tiller, a physician that provided 
abortions in his practice. Roeder admitted committing the crime in order to “save the 
lives of unborn children.”  
32. June 2009—Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammed  
American-born, Muslim convert Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammed carried out a 
deadly shooting in front of a Little Rock, Arkansas military recruiting station on June 1, 
2009. Muhammed committed the terrorist act to protest the U.S. military and “what they 
had done to Muslims in the past.” 
33. June 2009—James Wenneker Von Brunn  
James Von Brunn stormed the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in the 
District of Columbia on June 10, 2009. Von Brunn shot and killed a security guard in the 
attack. He had previously expressed racist views, wrote extensively on neo-Nazism, and 
fervently denied the holocaust.  
34. September 2009—Hosam Maher Husein Smadi  
Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, a Jordanian teenager illegally in the United States, 
attempted to explode a vehicle-borne bomb outside of Foundation Place in Dallas, Texas. 
FBI agents arrested Smadi after he attempted to detonate the bomb from a cell phone 
device. He was originally identified after using extremist websites online.  
35. September 2009—Michael C. Finton  
Michael C. Finton was arrested on September 23, 2009 after attempting to 
detonate a vehicle bomb at a federal courthouse in Springfield, Illinois. He drove the 
inactive bomb supplied by the FBI up to the building prior to detonation. Finton had 
converted to Islam while in prison and was motivated to attack a government building to 
force American troops out of Muslim lands.  
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36. November 2009—Nidal Malik Hasan  
Major Nidal Malik Hasan opened fire on a crowd within the Fort Hood military 
base in Texas on November 5, 2009. Hasan killed thirteen people and wounded thirty 
others. Hasan had often visited Islamic extremist websites and had contact with Anwar 
al-Awlaki, a known extreme Islamist. He sympathized with extremist views and held an 
anti-war stance. 
37. February 2010—Joseph Stack  
Joseph Stack conducted a suicide attack on an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
building by flying a plane into the building on February 18, 2010. Stack had grievances 
against the federal government and the IRS that were expressed in a suicide note. Stack’s 
attack killed one other person and wounded thirteen others.  
38. April 2010—Sandlin Matthew Smith  
Sandlin Matthew Smith was the prime suspect of a firebombing attack on a 
Jacksonville, Florida mosque in April 2010. He eventually was killed in a shootout with 
law enforcement in May 2011 after authorities received a tip regarding Smith.  
39. June 2010—Mark Krause  
Mark Krause was arrested after he left an explosive device outside of a polling 
place in Arkansas in June 2010. Krause was accused of planting a bomb made out of a 
soda can and owning an unregistered firearm.  
40. July 2010—Byron Williams  
Byron Williams engaged California Highway Patrol officers in a shootout after 
they attempted to cite him for moving violations on July 18, 2010. Williams was en route 
to attacking the ACLU and the Tides Foundation. He was inspired by Glenn Beck and 
was attempting to “start a revolution.”  
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41. July 2010—Paul Rockwood, Jr.  
Paul Rockwood converted to Islam and began following Anwar al-Awlaki’s 
vision of violent jihad against America. Rockwood created a list of individuals to be 
targeted for assassination and researched explosive techniques.  
42.  September 2010—James Lee  
James Lee took three hostages at the Discovery Channel headquarters in 
Montgomery County, Maryland in September 2010 to raise awareness on environmental 
issues. Lee had a firearm and metal canisters strapped to his torso. Lee had been 
demanding a boycott of Discovery Channel since 2008. evacuated/story?id=11535128) 
43. September 2010—Donny Mower  
On September 2, 2010, Donny Mower constructed a Molotov cocktail and threw 
it through a window of a Planned Parenthood Clinic. The clinic sustained major damage 
and was closed for two days. Mower had also thrown a brick at a local mosque and 
placed intimidating signs in front of the mosque a few weeks prior to the attack.  
44. September 2010—Sami Samir Hassoun  
FBI agents arrested Sami Samir Hassoun after placing a backpack he believed 
contained an explosive device outside of Wrigley Field in Chicago, Illinois. Hassoun 
attempted to detonate the bomb provided to him by an undercover FBI agent.  
45. October 2010—Farooque Ahmed  
Farooque Ahmed, a Pakistani-born Virginia man, was arrested after plotting to 
bomb the District of Columbia subway system. Ahmed cased the subway over the course 
of six months and eventually was arrested by the FBI as they posed as al Qaeda 
operatives prior to his operationalizing the plan.  
46. November 2010—Mohamed Osman Mohamud  
Mohamed Osman Mohamud was arrested on November 26, 2010 just prior to a 
well-attended Christmas tree lighting in Portland, Oregon. Mohamud planned to detonate 
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an explosive device during the ceremony; however, the bomb was supplied by an FBI 
informant and was rendered inoperable. The arrest was the culmination of a long-term 
operation led by the FBI.  
47. December 2010—Antonio Martinez  
Antonio Martinez, who prefers to be known as Muhammad Hussain, was arrested 
on December 8, 2010 after he attempted to detonate a vehicle bomb outside of a 
Catonsville, Maryland military recruitment center. The FBI provided the bomb. Prior to 
the plot, Martinez had posted extremist messages and anti-U.S. statements on Facebook.  
48. January 2011—Unknown  
Two small packages, one addressed to Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley and 
a one addressed to Maryland Secretary of Transportation Beverley Swaim-Staley, ignited 
in government buildings in January 2011. The incendiary devices were accompanied by a 
note that expressed the unknown terrorist’s displeasure with overhead roadway signs in 
Maryland that call for motorists to report suspicious activity to authorities. The attacks 
did not cause any significant casualties.  
49. January 2011—Kevin Harpham  
Kevin Harpham placed a pipe bomb on the route of a Martin Luther King, Jr. Day 
parade on January 17, 2011 in Spokane, Washington. Harpham was later arrested and 
charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction. He had previously 
expressed views consistent with the white supremacy movement.  
50. February 2011—Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari  
The FBI arrested Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari after placing an order for phenol, a 
toxic chemical that can be used to make an improvised explosive device. The suspicious 
purchases were tracked and Aldawsari’s emails monitored. He had planned to bomb a list 
of targets including, dams, power plants, military targets, and the residence of former 
President George W. Bush.  
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51. July 2011—Naser Jason Abdo  
Naser Jason Abdo, an absent without leave (AWOL) soldier, was arrested after 
plotting to assemble explosive devices with the intention of detonating them in a 
restaurant frequented by Fort Hood, Texas soldiers. Abdo was in possession of a .40 
caliber handgun, ammunition, and an Inspire magazine article entitled, “Make a bomb in 
the kitchen of your Mom.”  
52. September 2011—Rezwan Ferdaus  
Rezwan Ferdaus was arrested and charged with plotting an attack on the Pentagon 
and U.S. Capitol with a remote-controlled airplane filled with C-4 plastic explosives. 
Ferdaus was supplied the fake explosive by the FBI and arrested prior to operationalizing 
his plan.  
53. November 2011—Jose Pimentel  
The New York City Police Department Intelligence Division arrested Jose 
Pimentel in November 2011 after he attempted to build pipe bombs. Pimentel had 
recently converted to Islam and followed the radical teachings of Anwar al-Awlaki. The 
case against Pimentel was built by a confidential informant prior to, during, and after he 
attempted to build the explosive devices.  
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